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Review

ARTICLES

REGULAR FEATURES

new consolidated versions of the Treaties as amended by the TL is welcome and very necessary.

The Charter on Fundamental Rights will be incorporated by reference. It is said to be made legally binding but this clause will be examined with great interest. This seems a messy way to ensure protection of fundamental rights in the EU. In the TFEU there will be provision for the Union to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights.

It will be explicitly stated that the Union will only act within its competences. How could it do otherwise? Such a statement seems unduly defensive but a further concession to political sensitivity.

The provisions on democracy from the Constitutional Treaty will be inserted as Title II. National parliaments are to be given 8 weeks to comment on draft legislation and if there is a majority of (weighted) votes cast by these parliaments, the Commission will re-examine the draft. The Commission can still maintain the draft, but a special procedure is activated.

Institutional changes will have to be made to both treaties. The European Council is to be made an institution and to have its individual President as in the Constitutional Treaty. However, as this person cannot preside over every configuration of the Council of Ministers, the rotating six-monthly presidency will have to remain. The conundrum of the composition of the Commission must be resolved and the President is to be given an enhanced role. It may be possible for the same person to be President of both the Commission and the European Council. That would be a huge job, but splitting it makes little sense. Perhaps it is the opportunity for a two-person team, one to concentrate on diplomacy and public relations, the other on detail in the Commission.

There is to be a very long transition to the new double majority system of voting in the Council of Ministers, with the new system not to be fully operational until 2017, and even then, subject to exceptions as set out in Art I-25 of the Constitutional Treaty.

The ECT will be amended in particular to change its name and to subsume the EC within the EU. This may seem to achieve what many hoped for in a constitution: a short, readable document and a longer one with the details, but the TEU will not give an accurate picture of what the new EU will do.

So many of the innovations of the Constitutional Treaty are to be saved, but the whole exercise has the feeling of being taken away from the people and back into the safe hands of the politicians, bureaucrats and lawyers. Perhaps that is its natural home but it could be so much more. The EU got a long way as a technical, diplomatic apparatus, but it must embrace its mission to be democratic – truly a people's Europe.

STUDENT ESSAY:

TOTALITARIANISM – THE SPAWN OF EUROPE?

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Europe is a continent generally associated with such lofty events as the birth of the Enlightenment, and liberal democratic though. There is however, a flip-side to such great modern developments. In fact, it is feasible to assert that totalitarianism is, to an extent, both a European and a modern ideology. This essay will commence with a definition of key terms, namely 'totalitarian', 'European' and 'modern'. It will then examine certain political and social features of two countries - totalitarian Germany and Russia – including nationalism, ideas of universal class-based revolution, and use of liberal and Enlightenment ideals. It will conclude with the observation that it is possible to argue that totalitarianism in Germany and Russia drew upon modern European political theory and philosophical thought, and a reflection of the relevance of this observation for today's world.

Totalitarianism was a major twentieth century development. It first originated in the 1920s.[1] The term refers to a system in which control of the population is maximised – or 'total'- more so than in any other political system. It is the most extreme example of the individual's subordination to the state. Totalitarianism is a twentieth century phenomenon. This is attributable to the development during this period of technological means of controlling and transporting populations[2]. Furthermore, new means of mass communication, including the use of radio and cinema, citizens could be subject to a constant barrage of state propaganda in a way never before possible. A new emphasis on state education systems as a medium of information dissemination also contributed to the control of the state.[3] Thus, the state could achieve almost total control over individual citizens, in a manner not previously possible.

A widely cited analysis of totalitarianism was undertaken by Friedrich and Brzezinksi. The authors identified in total eight salient features of totalitarianism. These were firstly, an official, all-embracing, chiliastic ideology; a single mass party, typically led by one person (the dictator); a terrorising system of police control featuring arbitrary coercion; an effective monopoly of the means of communication; an effective monopoly of armed forces; a centrally-controlled economy; a commitment to expansionism and the administrative control of the justice system.[4] Another important feature emphasised by Arendt is a high level of citizen alienation.[5]

Criticisms of the concept include that the term is too broad to be useful, referring to the diversity of regimes categorised as totalitarianism, and also covering fundamental changes within individual regimes. The term is most useful if it is used as a paradigm, rather than as a model. Thus, totalitarianism as a political concept can be interpreted as, "a pure form of an idea, against which actual regimes are measured".[6]

Totalitarianism was originally an European phenomenon. Although totalitarianism later manifested itself outside Europe, with notable examples including Maoist China, DPR North

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[1] For example, from 1925 Mussolini employed the term to describe the Italian fascist system.
[2] Bauman, Z. 1991, *Modernity and Ambivalence*, Polity Press, Oxford UK, p145.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Freidrich C. J., Brzezinski, Z., 1965, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Harvard UP, Cambridge MA, p19.
[5] Arendt, H., 1951, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York.
[6] Holmes, L. *in* Smelser, N & Baltes, P. (eds.) 2001, *International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences*, Vol. 23, Amsterdam, p4.

struggle."[15] Links with modernity can be clearly identified when examining how totalitarian regimes in Germany and Russia drew upon nation and class.

Nationalism was an important product of modernity. It was both an intellectual and popular movement encompassing geography, history, language and culture in order to create distinct national identities within Europe. The German philosophers Herder, Hegel and Fichte were instrumental figures in the movement. The unification of Italy and Germany were two notable successes for nationalism. Annexation of colonies by European powers also helped to further nationalism, as European nations could define themselves against colonial countries, not just against other European peoples.

National unification was initially problematic for Germany – bringing together diverse peoples, with little shared history[16]. In order to counteract these difficulties, a process of mythologising nationalism was undertaken. Thus, commonalities of the people, such as folklore[17], anthems and ceremonies were popularised as a common history belonging to all German folk. The German thinker Herder developed in his writings the idea that the culture of the Volk (people) is innately valuable, and that each nation has a unique destiny. It is arguable that it was these ideas of nationalism, taken to an extreme, which helped fuel German totalitarianism. Thus, Hitler's Nationalist Socialist German Workers Party was, "an attempt to coerce a highly pluralistic and over-divided community into an ideologically unified frame."[18] Noted German historian Gerhard Ritter agrees with this statement, writing that, "*Volksfuhrer* Hitler's mission...was to accomplish that which the Emperor had been unable to accomplish...:to weld the nation into a closed, war-like community under the leadership of a really popular *Fuhrer*, respected by all..."[19] This attempt made use of nationalistic and patriotic devices. A speech made by Hitler to the assembled *Reichstag* exemplifies this: "I know parties no more, I only know Germans."[20] Ideals of courage, discipline, and selfless willingness to serve the community were implemented through participation in the armed forces, Hitler Youth and other community groups. The devotion of all forces towards one great end contributed to nationalistic and patriotic fervour. It can clearly be seen here that Hitler's Nazi Party made use of a legacy of modernity, nationalism, in order to further its totalitarian regime.

Soviet Russia employed different, class-based means to draw together its populous. The idea of a class based-vision linked to universal goals is an essentially modern one. It was through technological developments of modernity, culminating in the Industrial Revolution, that a working-class 'proletariat' first emerged. In Soviet Russia, the importance of a class-based world mission was heavily emphasised:

> "The strengthening of the internal and external position of the Soviet Union, the growth of its international importance and authority, its significance as a shock-brigade for the world proletariat and a powerful bulwark of the coming world proletarian revolution, are all very closely linked with the victories of communism in our country."[21]

Soviet Russia invested the industrial proletariat with a world-historical vision and construed its collective interest as a direct link to universal goals. This was an integral component of its totalitarian regime.[22] Yet the idea of universalism with equal rights being afforded to all, as touted by totalitarian Russia, has its roots in modernity.

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[15] Arnason. J.P. *in* Siegel, A. (ed.) 1998, *The Totalitarian Paradigm After The End of Communism*, Rodopi Publishing, Atlanta, p161.

[16] Edrich, C.J. *in* Huntington S. & Moore, C. 1970, *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*, Basic Books, New York, p241.

[17] I.e. The work of the Brother's Grimm.

[18] Friedrich, C.J. *in* Huntington S. & Moore, C. 1970, *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*, Basic Books, New York, p239.

[19] Ritter, G. *in* Snell, J.1966, *War and Totalitarianism*, D.C. Heath & Co., Boston, p728.

[20] *In* Snell, J.1966, *War and Totalitarianism*, D.C. Heath & Co., Boston, p728.

[21] Zhdanov, A.A., Speech at the First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers (1934) in Zhdanov, A.A., 1950, On Literature, Music and Philosophy, Lawrence & Wishart, London, p10.

[22] Unger, A. 1974, The Totalitarian Party: Party and People in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, p65.

centre of the ideology of modernity was the idea of the value of progress and of the superiority of the civilisation that promoted progress. This concept can certainly be identified in Nazi ideology, which praised the superiority of the German nation as it strived towards its goal of social restructuring. Again, clear links between modernity and totalitarian Germany can be identified here.

It is important to note however, that there is no direct and logical progression from modernity to totalitarianism. Whilst totalitarianism in Russia and Germany drew upon various modern influences, the examples given occurred in highly specific historical circumstances, in conjunction with other forces.

Whilst the analysis conducted here is not exhaustive, it goes some way to showing the influence of modernity on two European totalitarian regimes, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. This influence can be seen in the use of nationalism and class-based universalism. It can also be identified through liberal ideals of the Soviet regime, and through Enlightenment of self-determination and the perfectibility of man through science in Nazi Germany. Thus, it can be argued that in certain instances totalitarianism is, to an extent, both European and modern. At first glance, this conclusion seems counter-intuitive and contradictory to the historically-understood values and aims of modernity. Yet there are lessons to be learnt here, especially pertinent in today's world which also brays loudly of liberal democratic values only to silently succumb to fundamentalist and nationalist tendencies. *"History is not a straight line going from the beginning to the end, it loops and swirls, eventually finding its way back to places it has been before."*[34]

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http://web.syr.edu/~dtmerril/history_repeats.htm, "History Repeats": 12/9/06.

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[34] http://web.syr.edu/~dtmerril/history_repeats.htm

at large. Ultimately, through its powerfully evocative spatial and visual arrangement, which actually makes visible the consequences of German history, the museum confronts each visitor, thereby shaping memories on both the individual and the collective level.

The Museum

The architectural design of the museum itself articulates the history of the Jews of Berlin, and in many ways is contributing to the construction of a collective memory for all those who visit, and in particular for the city itself. In submitting his design to the city planners in 1989, Libeskind devoted himself to the spatial enactment of a philosophical problem, an architectural representation of historical meaning.[45] He sought to express the complex history of Jews in Berlin in architectural form and to make that story relevant to the present and future.

The linking of the Jewish Museum to the already existing Berlin Museum reflects the inextricable link between Berlin's history and culture and the city's Jewish culture.

Upon entering the Jewish museum, the visitor is faced with three subterranean axes which intersect but lead to different ends, each representing one of three realities of German-Jewish history.[46] The first and longest axis, which begins in the Berlin Museum, leads up through the Stairs of Continuity to the exhibition space; to the present, and as of yet uncertain future.[47] The second axis leads out into the Garden of Exile and Emigration, a garden which represents the disorientation which awaited those who left Berlin and the disorientation of Berlin.[48] Approaching the Garden, the corridor rises, the path to exile being a difficult one, and whilst daylight is visible at the end of the corridor, the space becomes gradually narrower.[49] Inside the Garden are 49 seven metre high concrete columns in a rigid grid, standing on slightly sloped ground. At the top of each, vegetation grows, but almost invisible to the visitor.

The third axis 'is a dead end, leading to the Holocaust tower.'[50] Entered through a heavy steel gate, the Holocaust tower is an oppressive and suffocating space. It is not heated in winter, nor cooled in summer, and lit only by a narrow shaft of natural light.[51] The hum of the city is clearly audible but inaccessible.

The final architectural feature of the museum, the void, perhaps communicates most remarkably the history of the Holocaust. The void is an empty space that runs through the centre of the museum, violating 'every space which it passes'.[52] It is consistently in the visitor's path. Through its inaccessibility, the void represents that which is absent, has vanished, but that must still be made present. However, the void does not simply make visible the disappearance of Berlin's Jews. It is representative of various voids which exist on different levels in Berlin: the absence of morality which allowed Berlin to void itself of Jews, an inner space empty of love and values that might have saved Berlin's Jews,[53] and the gap in continuity in the cultural history of Berlin's Jew.[54] This sense of a void is one of the central ideas behind the building, and as Caroline Weidmer articulates, is a 'brilliant architectural rendition of the ravages of a shattered civilisation.'[55] These articulated spaces force the visitor to engage with the implications of an ongoing history.[56] Combined, these architectural features form a

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[45] Young, At Memory's Edge, 163.

[46] Jewish Museum Berlin, "Architecture"; available from http://www.juedisches-museum-berlin.de/site/EN/04-Architecture/02-Libeskind-Building/04-Axes/axes.php; accessed 7 November 2006.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Libeskind, The Space of Encounter, 26.

[49] Jewish Museum Berlin, "Architecture"; available from http://www.juedisches-museum-berlin.de/site/EN/04-Architecture/02-Libeskind-Building/04-Axes/axes.php; accessed 7 November 2006.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Libeskind, The Space of Encounter, 26.

[52] Young, At Memory's Edge, 164.

[53] Ibid., 165.

[54] Maria Alvarez, "Angst and the Architect", The Age, 7 October 2000, 2.

[55] Caroline Weidmer, The Claims of Memory (London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 7.

[56] Libeskind, The Space of Encounter, 28.

James Young articulates, 'depending on where these memorials are constructed and by whom, these sites recall the past according to a variety of national myths, ideals, and political needs … each reflects both the past experiences and current lives of their communities, as well as the state's memory of itself.'[69] In Israel, martyrs and heroes are remembered, redeemed by the birth of the State of Israel, whilst in the US, the principles guiding Holocaust memorials are the American ideals of liberty, pluralism, and immigration.[70] In Germany, memorials tell of the absence of the Jews. This fracturing of the memory of the Holocaust in different countries demonstrates the subjectivity of memory. Berlin's Jewish Museum can be interpreted as having been built because of the government's and the country's need to explain the nation's past and to ensure that the Holocaust does not evaporate from the collective memory of society, to ensure that it is never forgotten.

Libeskind's personal background is also highly relevant to the question of how the museum constructs memory and represents history. Libeskind was born in post-war Poland, the son of Holocaust survivors, who had lost most of their family.[71] Feeling directly implicated in what the museum represents, Libeskind designed the museum according to his personal understanding of the events of the Holocaust, it is partially his response to the past.

The increasing temporal and generational distance from the experience of the Holocaust is also significant.[72] The museum was clearly built for a present and future Germany, for a Germany where personal memories of the Holocaust are slowly evaporating, and all memory is becoming second-hand. Over time, as new generations visit the museum under new circumstances, it will become invested with new meanings.[73] Consequently, the museum will never be static. Rather, the memory it constructs will be constantly evolving, as interpretations change and meaning is generated in new social and political environments.

All these factors combined illustrate well Maurice Halbwach's argument that memory is determined by a social context, as well as the notion 'that there are as many memories as there are groups, that memory is by nature multiple and yet specific; collective, plural, and yet individual.'[74] Furthermore, both individual memory and collective memory are an 'ongoing process'[75], subject to modification.

The Theatre of Memory and History

Whilst history and memory are two distinct ways of approaching the past, they are also mutually dependent. This is illustrated in Libeskind's museum, where the physical spaces evoke a representation of history and simultaneously construct memory.[76] Renowned violinist Isaak Stern expressed the view that 'the atmosphere of forlornness and disorientation was so strong that for me this building says more than a thousand memorials, statues, pictures, or screams.'[77] Thus, for every visitor, the museum is supplementing their memory or knowledge of the Holocaust and the history of the Jews in Berlin. Each visitor will take from their experience of Libeskind's building what their social framework allows them to, what their theatre of memory permits, and the museum will perhaps allow individuals to view their experiences differently and in a new matrix of meaning. Similarly, the museum is building a collective memory for the city of Berlin, and more expansively for all those who visit. Collective memory is formed

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[69] Young (ed.), *The Art of Memory*, 19.
[70] Young, The Texture of Memory, 2.
[71] Libeskind, The Space of Encounter, 23.
[72] Young (ed.), *The Art of Memory*, 13.
[73] Young, The Texture of Memory, 3.
[74] Nora, "Between Memory and History: *Les Lieux de Mémoire*", 122.
[75] Müller, Memory and Power in Post-War Europe, 21.
[76] Ibid., 39.
[77] Jewish Museum Berlin, "Press"; available from http://www.juedisches-museum-berlin.de/site/EN/06-Press/current_press.php; accessed 7 November 2006.

Germany and the repercussions of the Holocaust.[86] As the president of Berlin's Jewish Community commented upon approving Libeskind's design: 'No future visitor will be able to look around the Jewish Museum without taking in the history of Berlin; nor will anyone be able to visit the Berlin Musuem without experiencing the history of Berlin's Jewish citizens in the past and present.'[87]

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[86] Daniel Libeskind, "The Jewish Musuem Berlin: Between the Lines"; available from http://www.daniel-libeskind.com/projects/pro.html?ID=2; accessed 7 November 2006.

[87] As quoted in, Young, *At Memory's Edge*, 170.

In extending its borders to the east, the EU has embraced a number of highly diverse member states whilst at the same time diversifying its own membership base. This diversity, represented most clearly by the acceding CEECs, is the primary challenge of the 2004 enlargement. The inclusion of the cultural and ethnic watersheds of central and eastern Europe will likely alter notions of what it means to be 'European', and the degree to which 'Europeanness' comes to be correlated with the span and ideals of the EU itself. On an institutional level also, the inclusion of the CEECs could pose new challenges to the decision-making mechanisms of the EU-25 and, given their current attachment to the United States, further hinder the development of a common European stance in foreign policy. The CEECs are also far from a monolithic bloc of post-Soviet republics, diverging significantly in such areas as ethnic composition, economic development, previous relations with the EU and differing levels of success in implementing the *acquis* in the years leading up to the 2004 accession.[93]

Ultimately, of course, any survey into the 'success' of the EU's latest enlargement round has to measure itself against a predetermined set of goals. But the EU itself has not provided a succinct set of objectives for its project of enlargement: the avowed aim of creating 'an ever closer union' describes a process, not an end goal. The EU's *Agenda 2000: Strengthening and Widening the European Union* observes that one of the greatest tasks for the EU is to 'heal the divisions of Europe and to extend the peace and prosperity to the central and eastern European countries that present EU countries have'.[94] But such lofty aims leave the issue of political integration tantalizingly unanswered: is the EU aiming to be a loose economic union or some form of Westphalian super-state, complete with standing army and a unified foreign policy? It could be argued that this very ambiguity offers the only guarantee of consensus amongst so diverse a group of member states, who are each able interpret the end goal of European integration in a different way to suit the exigencies of domestic opinion.[95] If this is the case, the eastern enlargement is unlikely to wring a more precise end-goal out of the European Commission; if anything, the increased diversity of its membership means that the definition will only grow more vague.

Given that Jan Zielonka has written that 'one can hardly identify the aims and criteria of enlargement without determining the aims of the EU itself',[96] an analysis of the 2004 enlargement should begin with the challenge of diversity and how it is likely to impact on the current trajectory of European integration. Even with no clearly elucidated end goal, we can examine the degree to which the accession of ten different new member states – including eight CEECs – will strengthen or weaken Europe's proven ability to reach consensus, promote economic growth and carry on the underlying project of political integration in the coming years. Given the concerted attempts by the EU-15 to smooth the path to membership and ensure strict European 'standards' have been upheld in the transition, it could be said that the long-term credibility and power of the European project hinges on the success – or lack thereof – of the 2004 enlargement.

II

The main challenge arising from the European Union's enlargements – in the past, present and future – has been the challenge of diversity. In particular, the way in which the EU has managed to ameliorate the difference between member states and promote a culture of consensus in the face of such 'historical' antagonisms. While it may appear daunting, diversity has a tendency to be Janus-faced, able to act as the basis of a culture of consensus – in the sense of the EU's 'unity in diversity' rhetoric – just as easily as it can also create and exacerbate divisions on the European mainland. Jan Zielonka and Peter Mair have argued that

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[93] Inotai, "The 'Eastern Enlargements' of the European Union," 93-4.
[94] *Europe's Agenda 2000: Strengthening and Widening the European Union*, (Priority Publications Program, 1999), available [Online]: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/agenda2000/ public_en.pdf [Accessed 18 May 2006], 3.
[95] Zielonka, "How New Enlarged Borders Will Reshape the European Union," 508.
[96] Ibid., 528.

The question of European identity and the impact that the eastern enlargement will have on its long-term patterns are difficult to pin down with any certainty. The EU may have set thorough political and economic benchmarks for membership, but the Union remains ambiguous on the issue of identity: it has stated that any European democracy can theoretically apply for membership, yet has failed to provide a robust explanation of what is meant by 'European'.[104] This is unsurprising, since the question of 'Europe' is wrought with political and cultural implications that could create unnecessary tensions within the EU. As William Wallace has put it,

> What Europe you see depends on where you live. 'Europe' is a moveable set of myths and images, both positive and negative, embedded in national histories and vernacular literatures. There is no idea of Europe common to all European states, and therefore also no agreement on where Europe ends. West and East Europeans, Northern and Southern Europeans all have their own definition of what Europe means and where it ends – and all are equally convinced that they are offering a generally valid definition (emphases added).[105]

The emphasis on the national aspects of European identity has interesting parallels with Eurobarometer polls conducted before the 2004 accessions. The polls found that CEEC residents were more concerned in the instrumental gains that would result from EU membership rather than the edifying prospect of a 'return to Europe'.[106]

The main effect of the recent enlargement has been to extend the EU's territorial extent – and therefore its particular brand of 'European' identity – further across the continent. Although levels of European identification amongst EU citizens remain limited – usually playing second fiddle to national and regional allegiances – the extension of the EU to the eastern steppes and the Balkans arguably 'shuts out' any competing European model and asserts the primacy of the EU's own conception of Europe. Put differently, the European Union, since 2004 and more than ever before, is becoming coterminous with 'Europe', while 'European' is coming to describe the unique system of supranational, social democratic government that characterizes the Union.

On the whole, European identity is a luxurious concept. Given Europe's heterogeneity, some doubt 'whether the constitution of an European demos with a tenable collective identity is possible at all'.[107] Historically, Europeanness has primarily emerged in circumstances of political stability and economic prosperity, which could perhaps explain why the concept of Europe would appear weaker in the developing CEECs and stronger in the West. While there is clearly no single version of European identity, the EU has succeeded in identifying points of common interest – that is, political stability, social welfare and economic prosperity – upon which a sense of 'Europe' can be built. As Laurie Buonanno and Anna Deakin point out, the tradition of social democracy may prove to be the firmest basis for the formation of a European identity.[108] While the latest enlargement of the EU may challenge this Western conception of 'Europe', it will also likely strengthen the EU's credentials as the standard bearer for the peoples of Europe and create the conditions required for such the 'imagined community' of Europe to come about and flourish.[109] The degree to which the EU will be able to sustain this in the face of future enlargements – encompassing, for instance, Turkey, Ukraine and the Balkans – is still open for debate.

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[104] Robert A. Jones, The Politics and Economics of the European Union, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1996), 275.
[105] William Wallace, "Where Does Europe End? Dilemmas of Inclusion and Exclusion," in: Jan Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Borders of the European Union, (London & New York: Routledge, 2002), 79.
[106] Buonanno & Deakin, "European Identity," 87.
[107] Dieter Fuchs & Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "Eastward Enlargement of the European Union and the Identity of Europe," in: Mair & Zielonka (eds). The Enlarged European Union, 19.
[108] Buonanno & Deakin, "European Identity," 102.
[109] See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, (London & New York: Verso, 1991).

and the increased difficulty in reaching consensus on issues of security.[116] The stipulations of the Schengen agreement, governing Europe's border regime, has also affected trade in eastern Europe's border regions, bureaucratizing what have historically been flourishing cross-border transactions. In particular, trade over the Polish-Ukrainian border has run into difficulties under the provisions of Schengen, an occurrence that is likely to reinforce economic divisions between the EU and non-member states in future.[117] Given the EU's (at least partial) popular mandate, perceived drawbacks are almost as significant as actual ones. The issue of labour mobility in particular has long been the heart of opposition to the eastern enlargement, sparking fears that the industrialized Western economies would be flooded with cheap labour from the CEECs. Although the fears of mass migration from the East following the 2004 enlargement have so far proved misplaced, the EU has a considerable public relations challenge in attempting to convince EU-15 citizens that the enlargement will be in their long-term interest. Without the benefits of hindsight, it is difficult to judge how the attitude of the public may manifest itself in the medium to long-term. The failure of the draft EU Constitution to survive popular referendums in the EU-15 in 2005 may point the way to the future of the European integration project.

Even though the Union has been criticized by some for recreating old divisions further to the east with its latest enlargement,[118] such a division will in the long-term be preferable to the Iron Curtain division of the Cold War, even if only for the fact that the EU now encompasses more member states on the 'prosperous' side of Europe. The most pervasive effect of the enlargement may indeed be that it fortifies the European economy against the rise of newly industrializing and densely populated nations such as India and China. As Katinka Barysch has put it, 'enlargement has allowed the emergence of a pan-European division of labour. This, in turn, will help the EU economy to stay competitive in a globalized world economy'.[119] Like other processes of globalization – judgement upon which will be withheld – such competitiveness is not likely to be achieved painlessly.

A greater challenge, in the opinion of some, is that likely to result from the 'bridging' of legal and administrative gaps between the EU-15 and the new member states. Although the implementation of the *acquis* may have established a thorough legal conformity on paper, Zielonka points out that the same law may function differently in different places depending on the local legal culture.[120] Such local 'attitudes', masked by the top-down imposition of European legislation from Brussels, could also pose challenges to the functioning of the EU-25's decision-making bodies, such as the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the European Commission. Although the EU's decision-making processes do not seem to have been seriously 'paralyzed' by the 2004 enlargement, the alleged lack of a democratic culture in the east may prove to be the most problematic element of the Union's rush to welcome in the states of Eastern Europe. Overall, however, the institutional transition from the EU-15 to the EU-25 has been surprisingly smooth, clearly a result of the preplanning and institutional adjustments undertaken by the EU in the decade preceding the enlargement.

In the years leading up to the accession of the CEECs, the EU-15 made significant reforms to its existing institutions whilst avoiding an overhaul of its decision-making process. Both the 2000 Treaty of Nice and the 2003 Act of Accession sought to prepare the EU institutionally for enlargement. David Phinnemore points out that institutional reform has been a constant in the European integration process and would probably have taken place regardless of the enlargement.[121] In order to address fears that the EU would face intractable language complications and problems reaching consensus, the Council of Members implemented changes to its qualified majority voting (QMV) system, by which the EU's larger states will likely gain.

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[116] Sjursen, "Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy," 498.
[117] Buonanno & Deakin, "European Identity," 99.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Katinka Barysch, "Enlargement Two Years On: Economic Success or Political Failure?" *Briefing Paper for the Confederation of Danish Industries and the Central Organization of Industrial Employees in Denmark*, April 2006, available [Online]: http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/ essay_enlargement_two_%20barysch.pdf [Accessed 20 May 2006], 1.
[120] Zielonka, "How New Enlarged Borders Will Reshape the European Union," 513.
[121] David Phinnemore, "Institutions and Governance," in: Nugent (ed.), *European Union Enlargement*, 118 & 131.

significant military force beyond the newly created Rapid Response Force. It could also be argued that the values and norms that the EU projects through its particular form of consensus-based government are more effective at fostering stability and prosperity than, for instance, the 'hard power' approach of the United States, based primarily on military power.[131] The values and norms underpinning the project of EU enlargement – closely linked to perceptions of European identity – have their own appeal. The divergence of the EU member states during the Iraq crisis was a further expression of the diversity that exists both within the EU-15 and the EU-25. As we have already seen, disagreements between member states have not historically posed an insurmountable obstacle to the European integration project; there is no reason to believe that current differences will be any different. Furthermore, it is clear that such differences are not intractable: changes of government in Spain (2004) and Italy (2006) have effectively reversed the foreign policies of those nations. Such fluctuations and divisions are part and parcel of the day-to-day workings of a supranational, consensus-based entity such as the EU.

III

In much of the literature on European Union enlargement, there is a schism between constructivist and rationalist explanations of Europe's rush to enlarge. Those of the latter persuasion interpret enlargement as a policy driven by a clear perception of gain on the part of all involved. Constructivists, on the other hand, look to the less tangible norms and values – such as social democracy and economic liberalization – that have helped drive the enlargement process. In the final analysis, this dichotomy is perhaps a false one, for enlargement – and particularly the May 2004 enlargement into eastern Europe – has premised itself at various times on both rationales and benefited accordingly. As Heather Grabbe puts it, the twin processes of 'deepening' and 'widening' are not mutually exclusive, the latter perhaps offering more opportunities for the furthering of the project of European integration towards as-yet undefined ends.[132]

Without a definite end-goal, the benchmark by which we define European integration is open for negotiation. This survey has purposefully refrained from pinning down a subjective definition, which would have served to strait-jacket its analysis, given the diversity of opinion and the different visions for Europe's future expressed within the EU itself. Just as 'deepening' and 'widening' are not inherently contradictory processes, neither are the normative and materialistic challenges (and opportunities) of enlargement likely to play out in isolation. As an economic entity, the EU is constrained by its identification as a 'European' body. Likewise, the concept of welcoming the whole of 'Europe' under the EU's aegis is tempered by economic, political and strategic considerations. The interplay between these two factors will undoubtedly dictate any further enlargements of the EU to outlying regions of the continent.

It has been argued that the 2004 enlargement will ultimately strengthen the EU, both economically, shielding it from the effects of globalization, and politically, strengthening the sense of shared identity underpinning the Union – and, consequently, the EU's 'soft' or 'normative' power in an increasingly globalized world. However, just as past rounds of enlargement offer a spurious standard for judgment of the current enlargement round, so too will the current round not prove overly useful in judging the effects of any future expansion of the EU. The 'widening' of the EU in 2004 encompassed a particular group of CEECs that are well positioned, despite short-term challenges of economic underdevelopment and political instability, to form the core of a prosperous new Europe, freed from the polarization of the Cold War. It is possible that a further enlargement could stretch the boundaries of credibility too far, and weaken the EU's economic and normative power. In the mean time, however, the

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[131] See Frank Shimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 1 (2001): 47-80 & Sjursen, "Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy," 499-501.
[132] Heather Grabbe, "What the New Member States Bring Into the EU," in: Nugent (ed.), *European Union Enlargement*, 70.

Smith, Karen. "The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality," in: Cremona, Marise (ed). *The Enlargement of the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 105-40.

Sjursen, Helene. "Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy." *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2002): 491-513.

Stokke, Olav. "Aid and Political Conditionality: Core Issues and State of the Art," in: Stokke, Olav (ed). *Aid and Political Conditionality*. London & Portland: Frank Cass, 1995, 1-29.

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Zielonka, Jan (ed). *Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Borders of the European Union*. London & New York: Routledge, 2002.

Zielonka, Jan. "How New Enlarged Borders Will Reshape the European Union." *Journal of Common Market Studies* Vol.39, No.3 (September 2001): 507-36.

> *Despite the increasingly secular and pluralistic nature of French society, Catholicism is so clearly woven into the fabric of French history and culture that most other religions appear somehow foreign and do not fit comfortably into the French context.*[136]

Laïcité was designed for the French Catholic society, who faced little, if any, competition in the religious sphere and thus, *laïcité* is restricted to a mono-religious environment. Effectively, the relationship between *laïcité* and Islam in the late twentieth century is problematic and reveals that *laïcité*, in its traditional form, cannot escape its historical Catholic prejudice.

Laïcité, in relation to the historical balance between the Catholic Church and the State, was particularly challenged by the introduction of Islam to French society as a result of postcolonial immigration. Between 1954 and 1968, France 'welcomed' more than one million North Africans to her shores[137] and by 2004 the Muslim population of France totalled more than five million.[138] More importantly, at the same time, the Republican philosophy of racial equality was challenged by the foreignness of Islam to French society. According to the philosopher, Alexis de Tocqueville, Islam is incompatible with democracy and enlightenment due to "its inability... to separate the religious from the political and civil spheres."[139] This mindset holds that Islam opposes the very essence of *laïcité*. It has been emanated through the notion that Islam

> *challenges France's long national history of relations between religion and the state, starting with the emancipation of the individual from community constraints that were largely religious in nature.*[140]

However, this is a gross misconception because 95 percent of public opinion believes that it is possible to be fully integrated into French society and still practice Islam in private,[141] while "an ever larger number of Muslims appreciate the particular culture of *laïcité*, because it allows all religions to express themselves."[142] In addition, and to the detriment of Islam's integration into French society, Muslim immigrants have been grouped together in the French *banlieues*: "rundown high-rise estates in the outer suburbs"[143] where there is an unemployment rate greater than twenty percent.[144] The result is that concentration is synonymous with segregation, and "second- and third- generation immigrants thus feel doomed to a meaningless, ghettoised existence characterised by ostracism and economic deprivation."[145] Therefore, not only is Islam alien to the traditional French society, but it has also faced severe difficulty in terms of integration into the *laïque* structure of the Republic.

The considerable conflict between the theory and the reality of *laïcité* is illustrated by the inconsistencies between French legislation and society. The following laws exemplify the process of legislation regarding *laïcité*; firstly, under the Napoleon Concordat of 1802, Catholicism was recognised as the majority religion, secondly, the 1901 law on the Right of Associations rendered freedom of association a legal right, subject only to a simple declaration, and finally, the 1905 law on the separation of religion and state intended to

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[136] William Safran, op. cit. p. 58

[137] Neal Robinson, 'France', in David Westerlund and Ingvar Svanberg (eds.) *Islam Outside the Arab World,* New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1999, p. 340

[138] Emmanuel Terray, 'Headscarf Hysteria', *New Left Review* (March-April 2004) p. 120

[139] Cheryl B. Welch. *De Tocqueville,* Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 119

[140] Riva Kastoryano, loc. cit. p. 66

[141] IFOP- *Le Monde,* cited in *News from France,* 3 March 1994, p. 4 in William Safran, op. cit. p. 65

[142] Ibid.

[143] Neal Robinson, op. cit. p. 342

[144] Riva Kastoryano, loc. cit. p. 68

[145] Neal Robinson, op. cit. p. 354

initiatives for the integration of Islam into French society, the definitive conflict between public and private space has surfaced with *l'affaire du voile* in 1989 and again in 2003.

The school epitomises public space and is the point from which the headscarf debate has originated. Essentially, "the school was the cradle of *laïcité*, the place where the values of the French republic were nurtured and inculcated."[153] Just as "in France, any religious activity in public space is a threat to society's commitment to *laïcité* and church-state separation,"[154] the wearing of religious symbols in state schools is also perceived as a threat to *laïcité*. In Creil in October 1989, the case of three Muslim girls wearing headscarves whilst attending school "was widely condemned as an attack on the Republic, an affront to the dignity of women, and a threat to the secular status of the educational system."[155] According to the 1905 law, the principal had the legal right to expel the girls until the headscarves were removed and his decision was further justified by the Conseil d'État ruling of 27 November of that year, whereby "those best able to interpret (challenging or disruptive) behaviour were the teachers and school administrators who knew their pupils."[156] Such ambiguity by no means settled the debate and in 1994, the issue was raised again by Eugene Cheniere whose proposed bill for the banning of all ostentatious signs of religious affiliation was translated into a decree by the Minister of Education, Francois Bayrou.[157] Finally, the debate reached its height in 2003, when the Stasi Commission recommended a law, enforced as of October 2004, prohibiting the wearing of ostentatious religious signs in public schools.

Apart from the significance of the school as a public arena for republican values, the headscarf debate is a symptom of a much deeper social problem which can be traced to the first generation of Muslim immigrants and their alienation from French society. Joan Scott labels *l'affaire de voile* as symptomatic politics, arguing that "the banning of headscarves, offered as a solution, is in fact a symptom of the failing of French republicanism to respond to difficult and pressing issues."[158] This argument is reiterated by Gilles Kepel who asserts that the deeper social problem is "the underlying failure of French (and European) economies and programs to lift up Europe's immigrant poor."[159] William Safran is very pragmatic in claiming that "religious identities are too diverse, weak and unthreatening to undermine the stability of the French political community or the principle of *laïcité* on which it is based."[160] However, he disregards the fact that the situation in the French *banlieues* may give its residents enough impetus to bring the state to the brink of crisis, if the state does not reconcile the contemporary religious pluralism with a redefinition of *laïcité*. Such measures are critical because traditional *laïcité* fundamentally prevents the integration of Islam into French society, as it is value-loaded and blind to religious pluralism.

Beyond the controversial issues of pluralistic societies, transnational communities and the headscarf debate, lies the paradoxical definition of *laïcité*, which can be interpreted as either the suppression or tolerance of religious expression in its contemporary context. Tolerance effectively meant suppression for an Alsatian bishop in 1990, when he said that "Islam is

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[153] Joan W. Scott, 'Symptomatic Politics: The Banning of Islamic Headscarves in French Public Schools', *French Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 2005) p. 106

[154] Derek H. Davis 'Reacting to France's Ban: Headscarves and other Religious Attire in American Public Schools', *Journal of Church and State*, (Spring 2004) Vol. 46, No. 2, p. 223

[155] Neal Robinson, op. cit. p. 348

[156] Joan W. Scott, loc. cit. p. 107

[157] Ibid.

[158] Joan W. Scott, loc. cit. p. 116

[159] Gilles Kepel, 'Fabric of Society; Banning Headscarves is right. But it's only a start in bringing France's Muslims into the social mainstream', *Newsweek*, New York, 16 February 2004, p. 32

[160] William Safran, op. cit. p. 78

Laurence, Jonathan. 'From the Elysée Salon to the Table of the Republic: State-Islam Relations and the Integration of Muslims in France', *French Politics, Culture and Society,* Vol. 23, No. 1 (Spring 2005) pp. 37-64

Robinson, Neal. 'France', in David Westerlund and Ingvar Svanberg (eds.) *Islam Outside the Arab World,* New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1999

Safran, William. 'Religion and Laïcité in a Jacobin Republic: The Case of France', in William Safran (ed.) *The Secular and the Sacred, Nation, Religion and Politics,* London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003

Scott, Joan W. 'Symptomatic Politics: The Banning of Islamic Headscarves in French Public Schools', *French Politics, Culture and Society,* Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 2005) pp. 106-127

Terray, Emmanuel. 'Headscarf Hysteria', *New Left Review* (March-April 2004) pp. 118-127

Welch, Cheryl B. *De Tocqueville,* Oxford University Press, 2001

Modernists like Smith, Gellner and Anderson argue that nations are wholly modern phenomenon, although they differ over the mechanisms of nation formation. Smith defines the concept of a nation as a 'named human population sharing historical territory, common memories and myths of origin, a mass, standardized public culture, a common economy and a territorial mobility, and common legal rights and duties for all members of the collectivity'. National identity, as a concept 'both complex and highly abstract' embraces 'multiplicity of cultural identities, both now and in the past mirrored in the multiple dimensions of our conceptions of nationhood' (Smith 1997:323). These dimensions include: the territorial boundedness of separate cultural populations in their own homelands, shared myths of origin and historical memories of the population, the common bond of mass and standardized culture, a common territorial division of labour, with mobility for all members and ownership of resources by all members of the community and the possession by all members of a unified system of common <u>legal</u> rights and duties under common laws and institutions.

Gellner argues that nations and nationalism are products of growth-oriented industrial society (1983: 48-50). Industrialization and specialization required a large 'uniformly literate and technologically equipped workforce', which could only be supplied by the modern state. This support was also required for a compulsory and standardized education system.

__The historical development of a nation was also explored by Anderson (1983) who looked at not only how modern nations emerge, but how they maintain their status as nations. He claims that if we compare the modern nation to more archaic or traditional social formation, it becomes evident that the nation is too huge an entity for all its members to ever get to know each other personally. Yet fundamental to the sense of a nation is that all the members develop a unified community of people who share interests and concerns. He argues that the way to achieving unification in a modern nation is not by military means but through__ cultural measures. __Therefore education system, national media together with other means of cultural expression play a crucial role in enabling a nation to imagine itself as a coherent, meaningful and homogeneous community.__

Transfer of information and communication as stressed by Deutch (1957, 1964) act as a uniting force. People get united when they 'make transactions' by communicating and exchanging information and knowledge. Habermas (1962) argued that in the eighteenth century world of London coffee houses and clubs provided new possibilities for free exchanges of discourse as if between equals. From such exchanges reformist, egalitarian public debate emerged, opinion forming and indirectly governance. Drawing on Habermas, Fraser (1993) points out that there never was, and never should be, just one 'public sphere' but a number of public spheres. For her, what is at stake is not just discourse exchange but how stratified such publics should be, and how closely each is tied to the institutions of decision-making.

To conclude, the debate clearly proves that it is possible to create both a nation and a national identity. Borrowing from all the 'prescriptions' we can summarize that in order to form an identity of modern people in a modern state we need:

- institutions with:
- clear agenda being able to:
- make decisions over:
- clear territory inhabited by:
- educated populations bonded by:
- common past and memories and
- standardized culture with:
- common public sphere and
- common values guarded by:
- common laws produced by:
- common institutions able to:

In the first pillar the EU is most supranational and resembles a federation, with the EU having either exclusive or shared with MS competences in those areas. In its exclusive competences it is only the European Commission that has the right to initiative, whereas laws in 'shared competences' may be initiated by either the Commission or the Member States. Laws in the first pillar are passed by a so-called 'Community method' that is they require co-operation of European institutions (EU Commission, EU Parliament, Council of European Union, EU Court of Justice). In the second pillar (foreign affairs) the EU is intergovernmental acting more like an international organization whereas in the third pillar (home affairs) EU members act separately. It is believed that areas from the first pillar alone make up to 70-80% of national legislation of the Member States[166].

The draft European Constitution was meant to simplify and unify operations of the European Union. The Constitution proposed to abolish the pillar structure and to merge them with the EC into one single structure. Elected president would be in charge of the whole EU (not only the Commission) and vice-president would hold the foreign affairs portfolio. Through the Constitution, the entire EU would gain legal personality and a possibility to act internationally as one superstate. Those plans, however, came to a halt in May 2005 after the French and Dutch veto in the ratification process.

Why EU identity?

On the way to a federation but maybe never becoming one, do the Europeans need a political identity? If they already have multiple identities: social, religious, linguistic, regional, and national? If they do need it, why?

There a re a number of reasons of why a political identity of people of Europe is needed:
To answer the question – whether they need a political identity or not we must first realise whether the entire EU project is only an economic one, to serve business, production, investment and trade or is it something else that its architects wanted to achieve?

Series of political and cultural assumptions about the causes of wars and the future of European societies gave the foundation to the EU's conception of history. According to the Commission, the antithesis of peace and the major obstacle to European integration is the continuing presence of the nation-state and its allied ideology of nationalism. In his introduction of the European Commission's mass-circulation booklet 'a Citizen's Europe', Pascal Fontaine, a former assistant to Jean Monnet, asks:

'What alternative is there for the citizens of the new greater Europe, but a return to nationalism, insecurity and instability, if they opt for any course other than union and solidarity?' (1996:6)

As Konrad Adenauer, who as German Chancellor was one of the signatories of the Treaty of Rome wrote:

'I was in full agreement with the French government that the significance of the Schuman proposal was first and foremost political, not economic. This plan was to be the beginning of a federal structure of Europe'. (in Shore, 2000:16)

And Jean Monnet, the 'famous Father of Europe' declared:

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[166] interviews and communication with the EU Commission officials, July 2006

governments are more and more often not in a position to require obedience and identification of their people (Cerutti 2003:30).

Globalisation does not only affect the economy but also culture in the broadest possible meaning encompassing all creative industries: film, television and broadcasting, music, education, tourism, food industries and technology related industries: computer games, creative internet content etc. It's possible due to development of technology itself and communications. It used to be called westernisation but because Europe is not catching up with America so now it's called Americanisation.

And here, in this widely influenced by the Americans cultural field, is the space for Europe, to act as one to create common popular feeling of belonging to one European centre. It is common amongst culturalists to adhere to common European culture as opposed to American one. Some even suggest that Hollywood has not undermined European culture but in fact contributed to the awakening of European cultural consciousness (Garncarz 2002).

And ironically, when it comes to globalisation even the European far right movement, generally against the EU, gets united. It is now common to hear radical right populist leaders who support the European model of capitalism, the European welfare state and the need to use that state to protect society. There has been transition from a biological to a cultural exclusion. European radical right no longer argues that specific cultures are superior to others. Instead they claim that all cultures, European and non-European, have the right to protect their cultural identity. Intellectuals associated with movement of so-called 'racial racism' attempted to reground a post-fascist radical right, claiming that European civilisation needed to protect an reaffirm its own cultural identity (Zaslove, 2004:75). The juxtaposition of 'European civilization' and Christianity with non-European cultures and Islam in particular, has become essential for the radical right populist politics of exclusion. They are united in a way as they refer to and want to protect, not their national, but European culture and values.

And the last reason for the creation of common European identity is legitimacy of the EU project. That simply means, that in order 'to make Europe work, we need Europeans' (Shaw 1997).

Because of this reason or another or all of them combined, European economic co-operation, which was not envisaged as economic one only, needs peoples' support and identification with the project in order to function.

Forging the collective European identity

In case of the European Union, which itself is 'artificial construct' based upon agreements between the member States, the constructivist approach seems to be the right one. Unity was and is an ultimate goal of the Community's creation and existence. It appears, however, all the factors needed by constructivist approach to form an identity, are that in case of the European Union obstacles at the same time.

When it comes to strong institutions, the EU has no government as the Commission does not have a decision-making power and can only propose laws, not pass them. Its agenda changes every six months depending on rotating presidency. The territory of the EU changes every few years making it difficult for people to identify with. None of the Treaties mentions the final end and geographic boarders of EU expansion.

Europe's history, although culturally very creative one, politically it was always about wars, genocide, wars and more wars. Not a good ground for the people to feel united. But history and

Long before the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, with its official provisions on culture and citizenship aiming at formal creation of Europeans, the EU embarked upon various initiatives in the fields of education, youth, media and information policy to promote integration in the sphere of culture by enhancing what it saw as the European identity. The development of European policy on identity and citizenship can be divided into the following distinct stages (Kostakopulou 2001: 41):

- ***1957-72: the common market and the removal of obstacles to freedom of movement of people***
- 1973-84: the conceptual paradigm shift: political union and European identity
- 1984-91: a 'people's Europe' and a 'states' Europe'
- 1992-96: citizenship of the Union and 'Otherness'
- 1997 -   : strengthening the citizen dimension of the union' and security identities.

The first time when the idea of the European identity emerged on the political agenda is period between 1957-72. Although tin its early years the European Community represented the organization of industrial sector communities (McCormick 1999:68), the political dimensions of the project, as mentioned before, featured in the Schuman Plan. The Treaty of Rome form 1957 was not merely an economic text, it was a stage in the process toward a political union (Kostakopulou 2001: 41). The Community recognized in it that freedom of movement is not merely a functional prerequisite of the common market. The right to move was a 'fundamental right' of workers to improve their standard of living, which must be exercised in 'freedom and dignity'.

Workers were not seen as mere factors of economic production but as human beings. It's for this reason that the principle of non-discrimination was extended beyond the workplace to the broader social environment of the host Member State, and was advanced at the expense of national sovereignty. Because workers and their families were under European, not their national, regulation it can be said that a kind of 'European citizenship', although only for certain classes of people (workers and professionals), was born in the very first Treaty of 1957.

The most significant move from economic[167] to political union and the arrival of European identity on the Community's policy agenda was made in 1972 at the Paris Summit (Wiener 1998). To gain popular support, Europe was to be transformed from 'Europe of goods' into Europe of people' through more citizen-friendly and people-friendly approach (Kostakopulou 2001: 44). In 1973 when leaders of the then 9 MS signed the Declaration on European Identity. It proclaimed, amongst other things that the nine Members shared, 'the same attitudes to life, based on determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the individual'. The Declaration included five main features: special rights for the citizens were to be declared, reference to a common European heritage appeared, Community was about to act on the international stage[168] as one, a civic European identity was to become a Community law, rights were to be guaranteed to nationals of the Member States excluding non-national residents.

However, the formation of civic European identity was entrapped in Euro-nationalist themes and exclusion of third country nationals was in contradiction of European values of democracy and social justice. It was not clear, either, which special rights could be granted to citizens of the Members states as members of the Community.

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[167] Economic co-operation, as in the beginning, was to remove quantitative restrictions and customs duties, establish common external tariff and enable workers to travel freely to another Member State under the same conditions as nationals of that country

[168] in 1971 European Court of Justice decided that the Commissioner for Trade should represent the Community on the international stage by extension in the area of trade;
also in the early 1970 the Community started talks with African countries, former colonies of MS, to finally sign a Yaounde Agreement in 1975 with EC being signatory of it as one side, the other – the group of African states.

alive for the Europeans. The Committee also called for the formation of European sports teams, the transmission of more factual information about Community activities and their significance for European citizens, including of course historical events that led to creation of the Community itself and its achievements. School exchange programs were inaugurated, and 'European dimension' introduced into history lessons.

All those measures undertaken by the Committee were or are perceived now as populist (Shore 2000:46), but the Committee for the People's Europe went even further in its actions. It argued that transforming the European Community into a 'people's Europe also required a new set of symbols for communicating the principles and values upon which the Community is based, as in the Commission's view:

'symbols play a key role in consciousness raising, but there is also a need to make a European citizen aware of the different elements that go to make up his/her European identity, of our cultural unity with all its diversity of expression, and of the historical ties which link the nations of Europe' (CEC 1988:9).

In short, ordinary Europeans were seen as lacking sufficient consciousness of their European heritage and identity, and the Commission intended ti correct that fact. So the various symbolic measures that the Committee proposed included the creation the new EC emblem and flag. That flag was taken from the Council of Europe, it's dark blue and has a circle of 12 yellow stars. As the Council of Europe described it:

'Twelve stars was a symbol of perfection and plenitude, associated equally with the apostles, the sons of Jacob, the tables of the Roman legislator, the labours of Hercules, the hours of the day, the months of the year, or the signs of the Zodiac, the circular layout denoted union.' (cited in Shore 200:47)

Additionally, the twelve stars as Bainbridge and Teasdale (1995:189) noticed, were also a Christian symbol representing 'the Virgin Mary's halo'. No wonder then the Commission accepted the flag as symbol of 'European identity and European unification'. Other symbols included harmonizing European passport, driving licence, car-number plates and a European anthem, which was taken form Beethoven's 9th Symphony. European postal stamps were to be printed, EC Youth Orchestra, opera centre, European Literature Prize, European Woman of the Year Award and Jean Monnet Award to create new university courses on European Integration. The Commission also attempted to re-structure the calendar, by creating new events for celebration: European weeks, European culture months, European years dedicated to the promotion of certain themes: European year of cinema, or the environment and so on. The most significant date introduced to the calendar was 9th of May, the anniversary of the Schuman Plan, which was officially designated "Europe's Day'.

The political aim behind those initiatives was very ambitious: to reconfigure the symbolic ordering of time, space, information, education and the media in order to reflect the 'European dimension' and the presence of European Community institutions.

The situation of dealing with culture on the basis of economic terms changed dramatically with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which substantially enlarged the EU's sphere of governance. Its innovations included European citizenship[169] and the inclusion of new areas like culture,

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[169] EU citizenship established free movement and residence within the Community, rights to vote in EU Parliamentary elections and local election in the county of residence, diplomatic protection abroad for all Europeans, non judicial means of redress (petitions to EU Parliament and complaints to the EU Ombudsman). All the rights were not offered to non-EU nationals, and they were widely criticised for not bringing anything new as the citizens of EU Member States had already enjoyed them on the basis of their national citizenship.

modern social theorists. As the Commission saw it, forging an over-arching 'European identity' was simply a mater of grafting a higher collective identity on to and above existing regional or national, like Russian dolls or Chinese boxes. Different levels could be 'contained' within a hierarchy of nesting loyalties. But then, how could the weakest or nearly non-existent form of identity contain all others?

The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 brought a significant compromise on the issue of citizenship and political belonging: EU citizenship was to complement *not* replace national citizenship. The constructors of European identity tried to create a double sense of belonging: being British *and* being European. Non-EU nationals were excluded.[171] From 'Europe without frontiers' a 'fortress Europe' evolved.

Conclusion: does European identity exist?

It is a fact already that the EU is not solely economic in nature. With moves to establish a common citizenship with the EU passport, the elimination of national currencies, coordination of asylum and immigration policies and the creation of a European military force, integration is beginning to appear less and less economic and more and more political. It should also be noticed that while the process itself has focused on economics, the overriding goal of European integration, from the beginning, has been to prevent war on the European continent – to reduce nationalism and overcome hostility between European societies in order to provide long-term peace. So from the start its goal was equally economic as well as political.

As of 2006 there is no single EU policy on creating European identity. The aim to produce the idea is spread throughout various areas. Whilst more unity is forged through common currency – the Euro, European Monetary Union, constitutional, foreign, economic, as well as education, cultural and media policies, diversity is sustained by consecutive enlargements, and numerous languages[172]. Turkey, which is supposed to join around 2014, will add another language and more religious diversity. We may argue here that constant geographical changes do not work for the EU's image in people's minds. Even if there is some form of identification with the EU of today, because of frequent enlargement, it will soon be of no use. Possibility of 80 million Turkish Muslims becoming Europeans is hard for some to imagine and let alone to accept it.

So is there a European identity?
If we look back at the elements needed to form the identity, we will see that over the years the Commission tackled them all: one by one. But somehow the European identity was not and is not embraced by the Europeans. In the EU's short history, there was only one example when political identification with Europe, and not the nation-state, took place. It was in humiliated and defeated West Germany in its after war period when national identity had lost its appeal and many wanted to forget about being German. A few enthusiastically embraced the 'European idea', a politically united Europe with no national boarders. In 1959 only 7% of Germans felt proud of their political institutions and constitution. With time and economic success that followed, West Germans regained their sense of national belonging and faith in politics as the figure increased to 60% in the year 2000 (Conradt, 2005:81).

The EC/EU efforts to create European identity are full of ambiguities and incoherence. The public opinion agrees that the EU has problems with communicating its role and actions to the people. So that's why its provisions on citizenship do not always achieve their aim of creating

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[171] Although lobbied by immigrant groups, EU policy makers failed to recognize non-European immigrants as eligible for European citizenship. The only clause that was inserted in the Treaty was anti-discrimination provision.
[172] All languages of the EU are equally important. Each piece of law before going the Parliament, needs to be translated into all official languages.

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that permits the definers to do their defining. Put a little crudely, it is essential to keep pushing questions about the historically available conceptualisations of reality from the abstract 'What?' to the sociologically concrete 'Says who?' (Berger and Luckmann 1967:116)

Applying this line of reasoning to the theme of this seminar entails pushing questions like "What is economic development?" or "What does it mean to be part of the EU?" from the abstract 'What?' to the sociologically concrete 'Says who?'

Given that any body of knowledge exists within a particular social system, to begin to answer the 'Says who?' question requires an understanding of the particular social systems that frame the various definitions of 'economic development' and the various meanings of 'Europe' and 'European Union'. (Which is not to suggest that particular social systems are autonomous or disconnected from other social systems; but merely that socially distributed bodies of knowledge have their own relevance structures, situated within differentiated institutional settings.)

Understanding the social distribution of knowledge is important for an institution like Victoria University, which seeks to partner with the Bosnian community in capacity-building within the diaspora and within Bosnia itself. This is because the 'Bosnian community' is not an undifferentiated amorphous body speaking with the one voice, but comprises a diverse range of voices expressing distinct and at times contradictory and mutually exclusive viewpoints, experiences and aspirations.

The University's involvement with the community reflects a number of factors which have come together over the past 3-4 years. Their intersection has not been accidental or coincidental – but neither has it been the result of a carefully planned strategy. The intersecting elements include:

- A university mission "to transform the lives of individuals and develop the capacities of industry and communities [which includes a significant recently-settled Bosnian community] within the western Melbourne region and beyond through the power of vocational and higher education".
- In meeting this mission, picking up the so-called 'Malta model' of one of our predecessor institutions whereby how we address local community needs encompasses global outreach, such as serving as a conduit for maintaining connections with homeland institutions such as, in the case of the Bosnian community, the University of Sarajevo.
- Research interests of a number of staff in 'diaspora studies'.
- Pedagogical commitment to working with Bosnian background students on the basis of their particular interests and needs, including the impact of their recent traumatic history.
- The maintenance of a University 'Europe desk' with the brief to explore innovative links with Europe and with local communities of European provenance. This was previously the role of the University's Europe-Australia Institute, which had established with 'The Balkans in the global space: Meeting the economic, social and cultural challenges of adjustment and development' conference, jointly run with University of Ioannina and University of Tirana in 2000, a conference model including both local diaspora community partners and international university partners.
- The active support of leading community members who share the University's social justice agenda and who were able to harness their institutional connections to support University initiatives.
- The personal commitment and support of two successive regimes of vice-chancellors and senior officers to such initiatives.

Outcomes of the intersection of these elements include:

coming from. In the case of the Bosnian community, this includes the reality of the recent past associated with genocide and ethnic cleansing, mass deportation and displacement (Cigar 1995).

The reality is ever-present, never far from the surface of daily life. It is brought home to me every time I go into the house of any number of Bosnian friends in Melbourne who resettled in Australia as refugees, who face on a daily basis the grim reality of getting on with life without a husband or father, a cousin or brother. It confronted me on the television screen recently when the Australian Broadcasting Corporation screened a documentary on the fate of the women who had been systematically raped by Serb forces as part of their genocidal ethnic cleansing.

It was brought home to me when I visited the Bosnian café Saraj near our St Albans campus in the western suburbs of Melbourne and was introduced by my colleague and friend Hariz Halilovich to a young man in his late teens with a distinctive scar across his face. Hariz introduced 'Damir' (not his real name) as one of the best Bosnian soccer players in Australia. He was shy, but very polite and insisted on buying us drinks, which we promised to accept next time. Hariz, who at one stage was the young man's counsellor, told me the story about his scar. At the age of four, when the war broke out in Bosnia, Damir was forced to abandon his home village with his parents and seek shelter in a Bosniak enclave in eastern Bosnia. Before he turned five he had lost his mother when the room in which they were hiding received a direct mortar hit from the Serb military besieging the enclave. His mother used the only thing she had, her body, to protect her boy. Those who ran to assist found a decapitated woman with a traumatised child under her body. His father, devastated by his loss, managed to evacuate his wounded son with a UN convoy to Tuzla, where Damir's grandmother lived as a refugee. Soon after, the boy's father was also killed. His grandmother looked after him for a year but then she died and Damir was put in an orphanage, where he spent the next five years until, in 1998, his grownup half-brother, who lived as a refugee in Western Europe, included Damir in his application for resettlement in Australia.

In Melbourne, Damir did well playing soccer for local Bosnian clubs but had great difficulty adapting to the Australian school system and engaging in class activities. He preferred not to talk and would always keep one hand on his face, hiding the scar, and eventually he left school in favour of the anonymity that a construction site can offer to unskilled labourers. He was finally given the chance to have plastic surgery to remove the scar but on reflection he decided against the operation, preferring to wear the scar which served to remind him not only of the trauma and loss but also of the mother's love that had saved his life. By the time I met him, the scar was part of his identity as a person, a special person – someone whose mother was prepared to lay down her own life that her child might survive. Today on Saturdays he stars on soccer fields across the western suburbs of Melbourne, dreaming of one day playing with his compatriot Salihamidzic at Munich-Bayern, or at Real Madrid or Manchester United.

This, the European football league, is the only Europe that exists for Damir.

A few weeks after being introduced by Hariz to Damir at the café Saraj, Hariz and I were able to introduce Selmir, a Bosnian student studying for his BA in multimedia at the nearby St Albans campus, to this little bit of Bosnia in suburban Melbourne. Selmir had been brought to Australia early in 1997 by Moira Kelly from the Children First Foundation for an operation on his leg. He'd spent five months recovering from the surgery before returning to Bosnia, where he struggled to stay at school and cope with rehabilitation, when Moira stepped in again with an offer for him to return to Australia and commence school in the Victorian country town of Hamilton. It was the beginning of the 1999 school year and, for Selmir, the beginning of a new direction in his life. Courtesy of scholarships Moira had secured for him, he completed five years of high school before commencing a TAFE course at VU. Vice-Chancellor Harman had

how well the grafts were placed. I spent the next three months in the hospital recovering. Four months after the hospital my leg kept on getting infected so I was constantly in and out of hospital. In the meantime my brother and grandfather were released from the hospital and were on their way to recovery. The most painful process I had to go through during this time was when I found out that on my father's death certificate it was said that he died a natural death. This buried me alive – the lengths that people will go to cover something like this up.

For me it was only the start of a long painful process of recovery and at the same time grieving for the loss of my father. It was heart breaking for my mother. She was a lost soul who could not believe that something like this could have happened to our family.

By this time I had lost every inch of hope. But the tables turned and I was given the opportunity of a lifetime when Moira Kelly, who was working in the refugee camps in Capljina, south east of Mostar, asked if I wanted to go to Australia for extensive surgery on my badly damaged left leg. I spent five months in Australia in 1997 recovering from the surgery at Cabrini Hospital in Melbourne. I returned to Bosnia in mid 1997 and continued my rehabilitation in Fojnica, 100 kilometres northwest of Mostar. As I struggled to stay at school and continue with my rehab, I got an even better offer from Moira Kelly: I was asked to come to Australia and start my high school life in the town of Hamilton in western Victoria.

The year 1999 was the start of the new life for me, with new prospects and new boundaries to be crossed. It was an opportunity for me to start a new life and set up the direction for my life to come as well as help my long-time struggling family back in Bosnia.

After five years of high school I came to another obstacle. I knew that without further studies I would not able to get a job at home. But my long term guardian Moira Kelly persuaded the Vice-Chancellor at Victoria University to provide a scholarship which enabled me to study for a TAFE diploma. On my successful completion Professor Harman offered a full scholarship to complete the degree course, and this year (2006) I am enrolled in the Batchelor of Arts Multimedia at St Albans Campus, which I hope to finish at the end of 2007.

By completing this course and finding a job I will be able to help and protect my family financially, as I do at the moment with remittances from the small wage I receive working in a casual job. I owe lot to my family, especially to my brother who saved my life. I feel that it's my duty to provide them with better quality of life for the years to come. In the same way, I owe a lot to Australia and team from Victoria University, which I would like to pay back one day by helping them in their projects to help my country.

I know that Bosnia has recovered enormously thanks to the international community and their commitment help the people in Bosnia. But one of the sickening scenes for me every time I go back is the unemployment and the near poverty that so many people still endure. For example, my brother – the one to whom I owe my life – works at a carwash for 15 KM ($13) a day. He has no minimum working conditions and the business he works for is not even registered. Each night he comes home, separates some of his 15 KM for the family, put enough aside to fill his car with petrol, and save anything left over. You don't have to be a mathematician to work out what might be left over. The cornerstone of Bosnia's future is the young generation – and they seem to have been neglected by the Bosnian government. But I see a bright future shining for Bosnia. With the European Union in sight, all that's left to be done is to straighten

BBQs, holidays and all the other times we spent together. It brings memories from my friends and school friends as we went to school together, played together different sports, went on sports competitions and so on. I can clearly say that [the] best time of my life I spent in Srebrenica…. Unfortunately, since 1992 everything has changed. After that came the problems and the worries about all the family members, especially about my father. At the beginning of the war we were unclear about my father for more than two months - if he was alive or dead. Since the tragedy in July 1995 my whole life changed. Most of my family is either dead or missing since July 1995…. In July that year, I had experienced happiness and sadness at the same time, when we found out that my uncle had safely escaped this massacre, but no news about my father, nor two of my cousins, my grandfather and many relatives. Another reason to participate in the study tour is to give blood for identification of the missing persons, and hopefully I will be able to find out what happened with my father. To assure that this will never happen again we need to serve justice and get the people responsible for mass killings before trial - and try to find out how strong their hatred was, if they were able to do all those horrific killings.

To summarise it, I can say that [the] name Srebrenica brings the most beautiful feelings to me and on the other hand the most horrible feelings. I always ask myself two questions:

'Why did those people do all those horrible things?

How is a man able to commit mass killings?'

I'll share with you one other reflection: that of Saidin, a Victoria University performing arts student who was to stay on in Sarajevo as the University's first exchange student with the University of Sarajevo. The day before writing the following comments Saidin had viewed the now familiar video footage of Serb paramilitary soldiers executing six Bosnian Muslim men, one of whom – the man in the pale blue shirt – he recognised as his father, missing since 1995].

In [the] last 24 hours, a lot has changed with my view of Srebrenica Massacre and my whole perception of it….

After seeing that horrible footage I hardly can feel my legs, I avoid driving because I can't focus on anything but that one familiar image from that footage.

I am a man, I've been since '95 [when he was only thirteen], I've started enjoying my life but I didn't want to see that footage….

There is a lot of anger there, disgust and somehow desire to live even more fully; to go to the gym with more passion, to act with more passion, to write, improve, do.

I want to work hard, try to get my film off the ground, do as many things as I can to satisfy my desire to live a meaningful life.

Sometimes though, as I do now, I want to cry … I've gotten over that man in the blue shirt whose silhouette I kind of recognised in the footage, but man … Hey, it is hard to believe … you know … That man held my hand, liked to have a beer or two on the holidays, he believed in people more than he did in God, took me hunting … What can I tell you.

Who could believe, he seemed so powerless, broken, lonely … My dad, man.

What I have been talking about is one side of capacity-building – a side with which institutions like universities feel familiar and comfortable. As far as I know, all Australian universities talk in terms of Core Graduate Attributes, and there would be little difficulty in persuading colleagues as to the efficacy of a Study Tour when it is expressed in these terms.

What they also need to be persuaded to is the proposition that our role is not only to prepare our students for a meaningful career, but also to develop in them – and in ourselves – the capacity to recognise and experience the responsibilities of global citizenship. The challenge for universities is to go beyond the familiar commitment to core graduate attributes and employment prospects to ensure that such timeless questions as 'What is true?', 'What is good?' and 'How ought we to live?' inform what we do and what we pass on as knowledge.

From my involvement with Bosnian Australian students, I am buoyed by the indications that many are already asking these questions – along with the more predictable questions about how their studies are preparing them for the workplace. A few days after seeing the tape in which he recognised his father being tortured and killed, Saidin reflected on leaving Bosnia in 1998:

> You leave everything: your land, your history, people with the same genes as you … your blood relatives. You leave everything that you used to be and go in search of something you had been missing before. It's usually the peace of silence that lasts longer than the one in between two bombshell explosions….

> Then with time, in that newly found peaceful silence, you start to think of all those people you left behind, all the memories, days and nights. You start to think of your childhood home and the boys and the girls you went to primary school with. You start to think of how those boys would eventually become very good friends of yours and those girls would become beautiful women…. You start to imagine what would your life there be, if you had the time to grow up and live in your home town and on the land of your ancestors …

What comes out in Saidin's reflection is the interdependence of memory (of all those childhood friends you'd left behind) and imagination (of what your life might have been, if only …). The interdependence isn't fixed, but context-specific – in his case the context of seeing his father on the tape after a decade of uncertainty. The implicit reflexivity in Saidin's words – his awareness that the context affects what it is he remembers, what it is he recalls – draws our attention to the choices we make as we confront our reconstructions of the past.

Students like Saidin – and Admir and Damir and Selmir – remind us that it does not have to be a choice between the rebuilt Twin Towers and the EU as we know it on the one hand and the burnt out Parliament building and alienated farmers on the other. It really is a matter of being prepared to push the questions around economic development and what it means to be part of the EU from the abstract 'What?' to the sociologically concrete 'Says who?'

In places like Bosnia, the relations of material production are still different from those prevailing in other parts of Europe. The kinds of material relationships giving expression to 'Europe' or 'European Union' – such as the patterns of conduct that distinguish how politics or business is conducted – in places like Germany, Sweden or Austria, have not yet been universalized and internalized in places like Bosnia to the point where alternatives are unimaginable. The institutional arrangements which went by the name 'Yugoslavia' – and which for many years were co-extensive with objective reality – are still a recent memory in the minds of many, and are yet to be replaced by an equally compelling set of post-communist institutional arrangements claiming universal allegiance as 'reality'.

STUDENT ESSAY:

WHAT IS THE LEGACY OF 'GAULLISM' IN CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS ?

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'Is Chirac the new de Gaulle?' asked a CNN reporter two months after his 1995 presidential election victory. To which French political writer Jarreau commented that it was just like the Americans to simplify everything... [174]

Chirac's charisma and impudence certainly contributed to the connection to the great wartime general and founder of the Fifth Republic, and his proud views on France's independence and integrity certainly paralleled those of de Gaulle. The terms 'neo-Gaullism' and now 'Euro-Gaullism' have found their way into the current lingo of political commentary and many ask whether there is more than a lingering trace of this same brand of political style that thrust France into the world's proverbial face in the 1960s.

France's individuality, manifested through what is commonly seen as vehement anti-Americanism or conceited patriotism, is part of the dynamic persona of the two leaders which de Gaulle's and Chirac's regime share. This typical 'Gaullist' attitude of leaders is what many feel guides France's sometime problematic participation in international affairs, most notably its taking the lead of the anti-globalization movement in the late 1990s and its opposition to the United States' agenda in the Middle East.[175]

It is common to hear France berated for its arrogance and Gaullism attacked specifically as the root of this distinctly French problem. However, as this essay shall continue to argue, the nature of French politics is very different today than it was in de Gaulle's time and much of this criticism is simplistic or unfounded. Furthermore, the question of what remains of Gaullism and what it means to French foreign policy has become an issue of particular concern today, at a time when Europe is facing the challenge of exploring and establishing its own identity[176]. There is anxiety, particularly in the United States that Gaullism is metastasising in Europe and this may pose a challenge to the comfortably established unipolar system.[177] This essay shall further explore the growing concern around the notion of 'Euro-Gaullism.'

Gaullism is a political creed based on the thoughts and actions of Charles de Gaulle. When the general took the reigns of the floundering Fourth Republic during the Algerian crisis, he gave France a new sense of strength and importance. He redefined the country according to his 'certain idea of France', instilling in it a new sense of identity and a revitalised pride. De Gaulle underlined two fundamental notions of Gaullism : Grandeur and Unity. Grandeur naturally accompanies military and economic strength, while unity depends on a strong State and reconciled society. He advanced this through a historical conception of the nation in order

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[174] Patrick Jarreau, *La France de Chirac*, Paris: Flammarion, 1995, p. 189

[175] Sophie Meunier, 'Anti-Americanisms in France' in *French Politics, Culture and Society* (Summer 2005): p126(16)

[176] Richard Bernstein, 'Behind the Gallic bark, more rhetoric than bite' in *International Herald Tribune*, April 2, 2004

[177] Borut Grgic, 'Agog over Gaullism : Obsession with France skews U.S. priorities' in *International Herald Tribune*, August 27, 2003

'non' was as much a device to punish Chirac as it was a rebuke to the legitimacy of the European Union[188].

Much of what gave rise to Gaullism then, and has re-arisen now, is the complex problem France faces of uniting its rich tradition with contemporary change. De Gaulle asked whether France could modernise 'without ceasing to be French.'[189] France needed, he said 'to marry her century.'[190]

Compared to most other European countries, France underwent the most profound social and economic transformation in the 1950s and 1960s[191]. A rapid demographic change, 'national rabbitism[192],' propelled the long-time stagnant population and the booming babies were later to grow into French history's notorious youth[193]. Urbanisation and industrialisation saw old, rural, localised, and sectarian France rapidly transform into a 'modern' mass economy[194]. In the volatile climate of rapid social and economical change and political instability, many continue to praise de Gaulle's firm leadership for giving a somewhat fragile France strength and unity.

Chirac's regime faces a similar challenge of wedding tradition to change. Gaullism has emerged as a response to globalisation, which is often equated with Americanisation[195]. De Gaulle was notoriously anti-American. There was a visible national bitterness over the loss of Great Power Status[196]. He admonished France as being endowed by its glorious history to lead, even if it meant accepting an 'incandescent solitude on the world stage[197]'. Furthermore, through the spread of American culture the French saw a real anxiety over the threat to their own uniquely French way of life[198].

Much of this reflects, then and now, a certain nostalgia provoking a resistance to change. Only recently in what was very reminiscent of de Gaulle's promulgation of *la francophonie*, Chirac stormed out on French banker Seilliere for addressing the congregation at the European Union's employer's organization in English[199]. Apart from being humourous, Chirac's frustration is a shared one, and a real fear that one's cultural identity, of which national language is possibly the most significant aspect, is being overrun by the powerful momentum of globalization. Just as in the 1950s' anti-coca cola campaign, MacDonald's and fast food is seen as an insult, and potentially a threat, to French cuisine[200]. Sheep herder Bove Jose has been placed in the annals of history for his dismantling of a Macdonald's restaurant in protest[201]. These complaints are

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[188] Patrice de Beer, 'France's post-referendum trauma' in *Open Democracy*, May 31, 2005
http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-europe_constitution/no_vote_2557.jsp

[189] Williams and Harrison, *Politics and Society in de Gaulle's Republic*, p. 3

[190] Ibid.

[191] Ambler, *The Government and Politics of France*, p. 4

[192] Williams and Harrison, *Politics and Society in de Gaulle's Republic*, p. 9

[193] Ibid.

[194] Blondel, *Contemporary France*, p. 8

[195] Meunier, 'Anti-Americanisms in France'

[196] Meunier, 'Anti-Americanisms in France'

[197] Bernstein, 'Behind the Gallic bark, more rhetoric than bite'

[198] Meunier, 'Anti-Americanisms in France'

[199] Paul Kennedy, 'When Chirac postures, we shouldn't laugh' in *International Herald Tribune*, 13 April, 2006

[200] Meunier, 'Anti-Americanisms in France'

[201] Ibid.

the Berlin Blockade and the Cuban missile crisis, and Chirac was behind the US in the first Gulf War, in NATO's campaign in Kosovo, and in Afghanistan[208].

Journalist Richard Bernstein wrote that this issue has particular cogency today, when Chirac's patriotic rhetoric on France's 'special' role in the world makes him appear as a sort of 'better looking reincarnation of de Gaulle himself.' Furthermore, as Europe tries to explore and establish its own identity, this particular breed of nationalism is raising interest.[209] 'Euro-Gaullism' is on one side a reasoned criticism of America's foreign policy, and on the other a desire to build a European identity. Similar to Chirac and de Gaulle, there is a common desire in Europe to defend her rich historical traditions against the onslaught of homogenisation and to define itself as distinctly different from the US within a generically labelled western identity.

Gaullism has had an unfair reputation and has often been misunderstood, or taken to be a stronger force than it really is. Chirac's policy is so removed from that of de Gaulle that there is little left to compare in the two Gaullist parties of the UDR and UMP. Chirac's efforts towards strengthening European integration, giving authority to international organisations such as the UN and greater participation in NATO show a different political trend than that of de Gaulle.[210] It has come packaged in a lot of rhetoric about its 'eminent and exceptional destiny' and the 'genius of the nation'[211] that has allowed it to be seen as convoluted and more than a bit ridiculous in a peculiarly French sort of way.

Chirac is visible now for a strength derived in part from the growing economic and political strength of the European Union, and a personality that articulates a view shared by many Europeans beyond France. Had it not been for suspicion elsewhere in Europe about residual Gaullism, he might have achieved a lot more.

What is sometimes scathingly labeled as Gaullism is not much more than France's urge to create a Europe that is a counterweight to American dominance in the international arena. Gaullism was fundamentally about reestablishing a distinct French identity, a pride in being French and a common national unity, lending to France a sense of purpose and meaning. It meant emphasizing all that the French might believe about themselves, their ancestors the Gauls, cheese, the superiority of French wine and the desirability of having many sorts of cheese. This often meant asserting its opposition and rejecting being dominated by others. Gaullism is faint. It is a French breed of nationalism, but no more potent than that of the US or many other countries. Gaullism is 'more a rhetorical pose than a political reality' or as the French commentator Alain Duhamel described it, 'it is not a doctrine or a policy, but a sensibility[212].'

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[208] Bernstein, ''Behind the Gallic bark, more rhetoric than bite'

[209] Berstein, 'Behind the Gallic bark, more rhetoric than bite'

[210] Bernstein, 'Behind the Gallic bark, more rhetoric than bite'

[211] Touchard, *Le Gaullisme*, p. 295

[212] Grgic, 'Agog over Gaullism'

STUDENT ESSAY:

TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Today, Europe's treatment of Turkey is a sensitive subject. The success or failure of Turkish efforts to gain entry into the European Union is viewed by many as an embodiment of the rising tension between East and West. The eyes of the world are watching and how Europe chooses to handle Turkey's accession plans for membership may well affect perceptions of Europe worldwide. Turkey's candidature has generated heated debate and controversy since Turkey first requested entry in 1987. There are compelling arguments on both sides and considering the sensitivity of the issue and Turkey's culture, size, geographical position and history with Europe, it is not surprising that debate on Turkey's entry into the EU has generated such widespread contention. The political aims of the EUs integration process, its political and geographical limitations and the very nature of the Union have been challenged. In drawing attention to the very nature and objectives of the European Union, Turkey's candidature has unveiled the emergence of an *"ethical-cultural nationalism"*[213] within Europe. This has been evidenced in public opinion polls indicating strong opposition to Turkey's accession plans within the existing EU member states. The EU must eventually make the difficult decision to either: accept Turkey as a member and defy the majority of European citizens, or reject Turkey's bid for membership and be subject to world-wide criticism and contempt.

Turkey's bid for membership:

European Union Membership promises Turkey a multitude of benefits. As well as offering significant economic benefits, membership holds considerable psychological benefits for Turkey. The unfortunate geographical location of Turkey places it directly in between Europe and the Middle East. Turkey is not only in between the East and the West based on its geographical location, but also in terms of the country's government structure and culture. It is for this reason that Turkey has been faced with such a major identity crisis in recent history. Is Turkey a part of Europe or a part of the Middle-East? It stands as the only democratic Muslim nation in the world and comprises a mix of European and Eastern cultures. If Turkey was to gain Membership to the European Union, it would not just be a step towards greater democracy and prosperity in Turkey, but a step towards a clearer identity and greater feeling of acceptance and belonging. Turkey is well aware of these benefits of membership, but though the country has made its intention to join the EU abundantly clear, in its intense lobbying since first applying for entry on 14 April 1987, it has yet to make any real progress towards achieving this goal.

In spite of the widespread changes that Turkey has made in an effort to satisfy the membership criteria, set out in the EU Constitution and at the European Council Summit of Copenhagen in June 1993, it has not found gaining European Union membership to be an easy task. Article I-58

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[213] José Ignacio Torreblanca, "EUROPE'S REASONS AND TURKEY'S ACCESSION", February 7 2005, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/679.asp Viewed on 21 April 2006.

that the Turkish government was genuine in pursuing the objectives established in the National Programme of Turkey, the haste with which the draft was drawn up and passed is probably more of a reflection on the urgency the government was feeling to demonstrate progress before the December 2002 European Union summit; when Turkey hoped a date to begin membership negotiations with the EU would be decided on.

The Turkish Parliament passed further reforms on August 2, 2002 when it abolished the death penalty and lifted previous restrictions on the teaching and broadcasting of minority languages; particularly the Kurdish language. However, Human Rights Watch cautioned that *"permission is, in both cases, hedged with qualifications that could be used to block effective implementation"[224]*. The new reforms also failed to protect Turkey's longest-serving political prisoners including Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Dogan, and Selim Sadak who were all former Kurdish parliamentary deputies. Their unfair trial was condemned by the European Court of Human Rights. This omission was clearly more than an oversight. It appears that Turkey was passing these reforms simply because they were necessary for EU membership; rather than because Turkey had genuinely changed for the better and had suddenly decided to embrace such values as protection of privacy, freedom of thought and expression and male and female equality.

On November 5, 2003, the European Commission published the 2003 Strategy Paper *"Continuing Enlargement"[225]* and it's Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession. The report was based on a series of political, economic and legal criteria. The overall assessment of Turkey was critical about its performance on human rights, democracy, civil rights and the protection of minorities and particularly about the Cyprus issue: *"The absence of a settlement could become a serious obstacle to Turkey's EU aspirations"[226]*. The report also mentioned that *"in 2003 some 21,870 Turks submitted asylum claims in the EU, of which 2,127 were accepted"[227]*. This infers that the Turkish government was still persecuting over two thousand of its own citizens per year; which violates the Copenhagen criteria and Article I-2 of the *"Conditions for eligibility"[228]* set out in the EU Constitution.

With pressure mounting and the EU decision on whether or not to open accession negotiations with Turkey fast approaching, Turkey finally signed an agreement on January 2004 banning the death penalty in *all* circumstances. Elizabeth Andersen, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch's Europe and Central Asia division, remarked that *"Abolition of the death penalty is truly significant. Turkey has struck an important blow for the global effort to abolish the death*

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[224] Elizabeth Andersen, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch's Europe and Central Asia division, "Turkey's Bold Reforms Fail Imprisoned Legislators - Death penalty, language restrictions abolished; Kurdish parliamentarians still jailed", *Human Rights Watch* (New York, August 7, 2002), http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/turkey080702.htm Viewed on 1 April 2006.

[225] "CONTINUING ENLARGEMENT - Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the progress towards accession by Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey", *European Union*, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/strategy_paper2003_full_en.pdf Viewed on 3 April.

[226] "CONTINUING ENLARGEMENT - Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the progress towards accession by Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey", *European Union*, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/strategy_paper2003_full_en.pdf Viewed on 3 April.

[227] Frits Bolkestein, "What's wrong with Turkey?" The Taipei Times, Monday December 12 2005, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2005/12/12/2003284111 Viewed on April 7 2006

[228] European Communities, 1995-2006, "EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION", PART I, TITLE IX - UNION MEMBERSHIP, Article I-58 Conditions of eligibility and procedure for accession to the Union, *Europa - A Constitution for Europe*, http://europa.eu/constitution/en/part13_en.htm Viewed on 23 March 2006.

International outcry against the charges ensued and by 1 December Amnesty International had released a statement calling for Article 301 to be repealed and for Pamuk and six other people awaiting trial under the act to be freed. With pressure on the Turkish Justice Ministry mounting, on January 22 of 2006 the Ministry rejected the prosecution on a technicality. Though the dropping of charges was welcomed by EU enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn, who commented that *"This is obviously good news for Mr Pamuk, but it's also good news for freedom of expression in Turkey"[235]*, some EU representatives expressed disappointment that the justice ministry had rejected the prosecution on a technicality rather than on principle. One Ankara-based EU diplomat said, *"It is good the case has apparently been dropped, but the justice ministry never took a clear position or gave any sign of trying to defend Pamuk"[236]*.

It is significant that the announcement from Pamuk's lawyer that the charges against him had been dropped occurred in a week when the EU was scheduled to begin a review of the Turkish justice system. It is also significant that the actions of the Turkish government appear to bear no relation to the feelings and views of the general public. Many Turks were devastated that the charges were dropped. They objected to Pamuk concentrating his criticism against *"Turkey and Turks"[237]*, and for not being equally critical of other governments. When his trial was initially suspended, the BIA (*Independent Communication Network* in Turkish) reported that as Pamuk was being driven away, nationalist protesters outside the courtroom booed and attacked his car.

Bolkestein concluded his comments on Pamuk's case with: *"Turkey's effort to fine and imprison those who do not toe the official line convinces me that I was correct to oppose opening negotiations on the country's European Union membership"[238]*. Bolkestein offers an interesting insight into some of the arguments against Turkey's entry into the Union. He believes *"intolerance goes right to the top of the Turkish government"[239]* and uses Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül's cancellation of a press conference in Copenhagen as an example. Apparently the cancellation resulted from the Danes refusal to evict a Kurdish journalist that the Foreign Minister spotted in the audience.

Opposition to Turkey's accession plans:

European leaders are still concerned with Turkey's human rights record and are calling on the Turkish government to resolve its disputes with Greece and put an end to conflict with Kurdish rebels before it can be seriously considered for membership. But many Turks point to European prejudice against Muslims as the real reason behind Turkey's lack of progress towards accession

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[235] PEN American Center also denounced the charges against Pamuk, stating: *"PEN finds it extraordinary that a state that has ratified both the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights, both of which see freedom of expression as central, should have a Penal Code that includes a clause that is so clearly contrary to these very same principles"*. "EU'S CONDITIONAL WELCOME ON DROPPED TURKISH NOVELIST PROSECUTION", Enlargement Newsletter, *January 27 2006*, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/latest_weekly_27012006.htm Viewed on April 12 2006.

[236] "EU'S CONDITIONAL WELCOME ON DROPPED TURKISH NOVELIST PROSECUTION", Enlargement Newsletter, *January 27 2006*, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/latest_weekly_27012006.htm Viewed on April 12 2006.

[237] Ayşe Özgün, "Orhan Pamuk vs. Michael Moore", *Turkish Daily News*, Friday February 25 2005, http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=6698 Viewed on April 12 2006.

[238] Frits Bolkestein, "What's wrong with Turkey?" The Taipei Times, Monday December 12 2005, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2005/12/12/2003284111 Viewed on April 7 2006

[239] Frits Bolkestein, "What's wrong with Turkey?" The Taipei Times, Monday December 12 2005, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2005/12/12/2003284111 Viewed on April 7 2006

European Nationalism *"has been reawakened by the forces of globalization"* and that this nationalism *"threatens to destroy the very soul of the union"*[246].

It appears that Christianity is the driving force behind this resurgence in European nationalism. Hans van Mierlo, foreign minister of the Netherlands, commented that *"There is a problem of a large Muslim state"* and questioned: *"Do we want that in Europe? It is an unspoken question"*[247]. If these comments are any indication of European public opinion, it would seem that Europeans consider themselves foremost as Christians. In Germany, Christian Democrat leader Angela Merkel is clearly opposed to Turkey's bid for membership: *"Inviting Turkey to become a candidate for European Union membership was a mistake"*. She appeals to Europe's strong Christian sentiments by suggesting we *"Try opening a Christian church in Istanbul"*[248]; referring to Turkey's history of burning down Christian churches and delaying building approval for such structures. Perhaps Valery Giscard d'Estaing, former French President, was on to something when he described the EU as a *"Christian club"*[249] to Le Monde newspaper.

Clearly, religion is not the only thing separating Turkey from Europe, the history between Europe and Turkey dates back hundreds of years to an era when Europe was still worried the Ottomans might expand the Sultan's empire into France and Germany. The height of the tension occurred when Ottoman armies nearly took Vienna in 1683. Clearly European ambivalence toward Turkey is nothing new. Turkey's supporters believe *"Turks aren't good enough"*[250] for the Europeans. Yet there is air of arrogance on both sides. Yilidrim Akturk, an American-trained economist and a member of Parliament, reminds us that Turkey enjoyed *"600 years as masters of the Ottoman Empire,"* and hinted at a possible reason for Turkey's apparent difficulty in co-operating with the Europeans: *"We don't believe in bending over, even if it's to pick up a big check. We want to preserve our pride"*[251].

Aside from all of the emotional arguments against Turkey's accession, there are some overriding practical considerations. There is a widely held belief that enlargement would cause disparity and make the EU more difficult to control. Many Europeans believe that Turkey's population is too big and its economy too weak for the EU to support. Turkey has a population of 68 million, which would make it the second largest population in the EU, but one of the poorest economies. Many fear that masses of Turkey's population will migrate northwest to find economic opportunities. In spite of these concerns, there is no solid evidence to suggest that Turkey's accession would cause significant economic hardship to the EU; let alone its economic ruin. There has been some evidence put forward suggesting that the EU would gain significant economic benefits from Turkey's accession; but these assertions are also yet to be

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[246] Abid Mustafa, EU crisis reveals important lessons for Muslims, Al-Jazeerah, July 9, 2005, http://www.aljazeerah.info/Opinion%20editorials/2005%20Opinion%20Editorials/July/9o/EU%20crisis%20reveals%20important%20lessons%20for%20Muslims%20By%20Abid%20Mustafa.htm Viewed on April 20 2006.

[247] "HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/HELSINKI", Unknown Author, http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/hrw-helsinki-turkey97.html Viewed on March 24.

[248] Ryan Burns, "Europe's Muslim Future", *The Globe,* October 2005, **http://www.gwias.com/globe/archive/000072.html** Viewed on 23 April 2006.

[249] Skopiestelos, "Valery Giscard d'Estaing: Turkey is not a European country", *Agean Times,* http://www.aegeantimes.net/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=854 Viewed on Appril 14 2006.

[250] Gail Schoettler, "Politics of nationalism", Denver Post, *12 Jun 2005* http://www.peyamner.com/article.php?id=12225&lang=english Viewed on April 2 2006.

[251] STEPHEN KINZER, "Turkey Finds European Union Door Slow to Open," *New York Times,* February 23 1997, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/euturk.htm, Viewed on April 3 2006

become a more democratic process. If the criteria do not change and Turkey fulfils all of the existing criteria, then the EU will have little choice, but to accept Turkey as a member.

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HARNESSING THE POWER OF DIASPORAS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE MACEDONIAN DIASPORA IN AUSTRALIA AND GLOBALLY

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Diasporas will be as big as the issues that worry them and the steps they take now to shape a preferred future.

Abstract

The positive and significant relationship between diasporas and development has been recognized by the World Bank, by the European Commission, by nation states like Australia, Ireland, Israel and Singapore, by prominent think tanks and academic researchers like the European Diaspora Research Network. Most recently, the Republic of Macedonia has announced the development of a National Strategy for the Diaspora under the auspices of its Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Australian Macedonian Diaspora has developed a concept paper for the establishment of a Global Institute for Macedonian Advancement.

In keeping with the theme of the conference, this discussion paper explores strategies for harnessing the power of the Macedonian diaspora in Australia and globally to contribute to European integration and to help migrate the endangered Macedonian nation and the Macedonian State to a sustainable future. The paper examines the various dimensions of power associated with the Macedonian diaspora and how this under-utilized and under-researched resource might be used for positive social, economic and political advancement and integration of Macedonia in the European Union and in global civilisational improvement projects. The paper also explores the pressing challenges and opportunities facing the Macedonian diaspora in its mission to play a more active role as a change agent and builder of social capital in its host country and its former homeland and beyond.

Part 1: Brief History of Macedonian Diaspora in the 20th Century

Macedonian emigration in the 20th Century is a product of economic, political and social crisis in the homeland and a response to the opportunities for a better life in new lands such as Australia. At the beginning of the 20th Century, Macedonia and its people found themselves under the crushing rule of the Ottoman Empire whose occupation of the Balkans dates back to late 14th century. The rebellion against Ottoman occupation and the creation of the first short-lived Republic in the Balkans in 1903 known as 'Krushevska Republika' resulted in brutal reprisals by the Ottomans and marked the start of new waves of emigration to Europe, the Americas and Australia.

Decisive battles in the First World War were fought on Macedonian soil especially the *'Thessalonki Front'* which resulted in substantial losses of life and property which again forced people to leave their ancestral lands.
The Great Depression in the 1930's and the Second World War also played a key role in out migration. Similarly, the Civil War in Greece from 1946-1949 and the open borders under Tito's Yugoslavia provided a fertile ground for emigration to the West.

Second, power is analysed in the context of politics, business, financial services, international affairs, media, public administration, NGO's, education and the Arts.

By using the Matrix Model and more refined instruments, researchers and community leaders can start producing Diaspora Power Profiles and Diaspora Social and Political Network Analysis (Lin,1999) to begin assessing the extent to which European Diasporas in Australia are positioned to contribute to European Integration and other transnational projects.

In the case of the Macedonian Diaspora in Australia, the various dimensions of power associated with this community have yet to be rigorously researched from a quantitative and qualitative perspective. This could be a good PhD Research topic.

It is difficult to obtain funding from the ARC for PhD Diaspora Research Projects given that 'diasporas' at present are not classified as part of the national research priorities.

Part 3: Strategies for Harnessing the Power of the Macedonian Diaspora in Australia and Globally

In my view, diasporas in Australia and Australia's diaspora in the world should be declared a **'national strategic asset'** over and above the current policies of Multiculturalism at Federal and State level.

Similarly, the Republic of Macedonia should formally recognize the strategic, economic and social capital of its diaspora and develop its Diaspora Strategy with a budget commensurate with the task and explore meaningful ways for engaging with diaspora.

Funding should be made available so that this under-utilized and under-researched resource can be used for positive social, economic and political advancement of Australia and closer relations with the European Union and involvement in global civilisational improvement projects such as poverty elimination, development, debate on climate change, refugee flows etc. Similarly, funding should be made available by the Republic of Macedonia and the diaspora itself for joint strategic projects.

Efforts must be made to identify and engage with leaders of stakeholder groups who are interested and capable of making a difference to the debate and status of Diasporas in Australia and globally. The issue of diasporas needs to be on the 'radar screen' of key stakeholders. Interest in Diasporas can be sustained by developing and implementing a Stakeholder Relations and Communication Plan that brings together scholars and research students with leaders from politics, business, philanthropists, public officials and the media to share their perspectives on diaspora related issues.

The potential contribution of European Diasporas in Australia to European integration can not be positively exploited without Strategy and Action Plans backed up by budgets and partnerships.

<u>Research:</u> It is first necessary for European Diaspora Research Network and others such as this to communicate the Diaspora Value Proposition to funding bodies, policy makers and the media based on facts. The use of an evidence based approach to the management of diaspora issues and policies can greatly facilitate the Diaspora research agenda.

It is necessary to secure funding for Diaspora Professorships and for PhD students to devote their energies to building up profiles of the community using official census and other data that is available. The establishment of a *Diaspora Research Foundation* may be worth exploring

Government - Diaspora Partnerships

Building partnerships between Government and Diasporas is critical to harnessing the power of both parties. The challenge for the Australian Macedonian diaspora is to build meaningful partnerships with Australian Government departments on a local, state, national and international scale.

Similarly, the Macedonian diaspora needs to work on building relations with the Government of Macedonia and the European Commission.

The diaspora needs to feel that its contribution is required and important. Inviting the Macedonian diaspora from around the world to comment on Macedonia's Strategy for Euro-Integration and to contribute to the shaping of the National Diaspora Strategy are essential steps for building bridges between the two sides.

University and Diaspora Partnerships

Universities and their research networks can play a critical role in facilitating the development and contribution of European and other diasporas to national and international development issues. The importance of this partnership can not be overlooked as communities need the guidance and assistance of professional researchers to help them shape strategies for full engagement with the host society and their former homelands. In this context, I would like to congratulate Victoria University for its on-going interest in the Balkans and to all Universities who support the work of the Contemporary European Studies Association.

Think tanks are another partner that diasporas can engage with in the search for solutions to pressing issues facing societies. The Centre for Social Innovation at Stanford University regularly publishes research which can be of value to diasporas. Diaspora organizations must try to bring themselves up to speed with what has been researched and use published research findings to improve the quality of their decision-making and advocacy capabilities.

Diasporas can also learn the craft of how to influence public policy from think-tanks like the Brookings Institute, based in Washington D.C.

Diasporas and NGOs/Civil Society

The influence of NGOs and civil society organizations on public and corporate policies has grown substantially in the last decade.

In particular, I would like to mention the important role played by the Soros Foundation in Central and South Eastern Europe and similar bodies who have invested resources in many important empowerment and transformational change projects.

Diasporas should take advantage of the opportunities for collaboration with NGOs and civil society groups in their quest to initiate reforms and improve the quality of life in their former homelands.

Diasporas and the Progressive Corporate Sector

Diasporas can take advantage of the growing trend and popularity of Corporate Social Responsibility, Good Governance, Corporate Citizenship, Corporate Philanthropy and Business Ethics. Publications like *Ethical Corporation* can help Diasporas identify which Corporations they can work with for mutual advantage.

With a carefully constructed value proposition and good public affairs, diasporas can develop alliances with enlightened corporations and work on collaborative projects (Black and Hohnen, 2006)

Mastering the art of ethical influence can build commitment among key stakeholders to your cause. It is a way of persuading stakeholders to give more of their time and connections and to boost fundraising effectiveness.

Learning from Giants like Mahatma Gandhi
If we want change we must become the change to which we aspire.

Part 4: Challenges and opportunities facing the Australian Macedonian diaspora in its mission to play a more active and constructive role in its host country and its former homeland and the beyond.

Standing still is not an option: We must embrace change, practice Strategic Foresight and become Social Innovators and Social Entrepreneurs!

The current status quo of limited engagement or disengagement with stakeholders in Australia and in Europe is not in the interest of community sustainability and its reputation.

The Australian Macedonians need to reconnect with one another, with stakeholders in Australia and globally.

Unlocking the diaspora's potential to affect social change by assisting humanity and integration in Australia and globally is the name of the game.
Under the new Social Innovation and Entrepreneurship Model, the diaspora needs leaders and organisations to become:

Ambitious: prepared to tackle major social, economic and environmental issues;
Mission Driven: generating social capital and social value for the benefit of humanity.
Strategic: focus on opportunities to improve systems, create solutions and invent new approaches that create social capital and a preferred future.
Resourceful: exceptionally skilled at mustering and mobilizing human, financial and political resources.
Results oriented: producing measurable results that transform existing realities, open pathways for the marginalized and unlock the community's potential to effect social change.

It is incumbent upon the younger generations to again build social capital, to create sustainable community organisations and to take the lead in the creation of a collectively caring and innovative community. I would recommend to anyone interested in social capital to read Robert Putman's *Bowling Alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. Also see Durlauf and Fanfchamps (2004) for a survey of research on social capital.

The Macedonian diaspora in Australia should work on its image with a view to becoming trendy, progressive and pro-active. We must stop blaming others for our problems and accept responsibility for shaping the future. We must put our money where our mouth is and also look for external funding options.

The community leaders should convene a *Future Directions Forum* and develop a clear Vision and Mission for the community followed by a Strategic and Operational Plan. The key strategic challenges and issues facing the diaspora in Australia should be identified, debated and isolated for action.

In particular, a Theory of Change (see www.theoryofchange.org) or Roadmap needs to be developed which identifies the preconditions, pathways and interventions necessary for the diaspora to initiate and sustain positive change.

INDIVISIBLE PARTNERS OR ENDURING COMBATANTS?

DIVISIONS AND TRIUMPHS IN THE EU-AUSTRALIAN RELATIONSHIP

Luke Raffin

Since it was formed in the aftermath of the Second World War, the European Union has shared a roller coaster ride with Australia through the vicissitudes of their relationship. In light of the volatility of their engagement, are the EU and Australia really divided by a 'trans-hemispheric rift', a 'gulf of misunderstanding' (Murray 2005: 6-7), or are these simply superficial quarrels that inevitably emerge from an intimate relationship? This article will juxtapose the divisions that undermine the EU-Australian relationship with the factors that strengthen the partnership. First, it will observe that Australia and the EU are separated by their inequality. After examining the divisive role of the Common Agricultural Policy ('CAP') (Murray 2002a: 162), the article will contend that Australia's preoccupation with European protectionism has inhibited the broadening of the scope of their engagement. The bilateral lens through which the Howard Government prefers to view Europe has hindered the advancement of relations with the EU through a regionalist paradigm. Furthermore, Canberra's close relationship with the United States, global environmental policy and the failure to secure a Framework Agreement demonstrates the contemporary variation between Australia and the EU.

Despite these weighty differences, this article maintains that the factors uniting Australia and the EU ultimately prevail. The CAP's ability to undermine the relationship is lessening. Beyond agriculture, Australia and the EU have forged a lengthy record of trade cooperation. Social, political and cultural integration is evolving, diversifying and intensifying. Australia's increasing involvement in Asia not only begins to surmount the obstacle of exclusion from regional citizenship but also enhances Australia's capacity to engage with Europe. Ultimately, the intrinsic bonds uniting the EU and Australia outweigh the divisions in their relationship. Like most partnerships, conflict can be frequent, but there is much more that unites Australia and the EU than divides them.

The Divisions of Inequality

On a fundamental level, Australia and Europe are divided by their differing political and economic and influence. As Murray accurately observes, the EU-Australia relationship is 'an asymmetrical one'. As a 'middle power', Australia is 'low on the hierarchy of states' (Murray et. al. 2002: 395; Cooper et. al 1993; Coleman and Underhill 1998: 9). Its resilient but medium-sized economy, limited military capacity and moderate political power relegates Australia down the list of the EU's priorities (Murray 2002b: 69; Piening 1997: 163). Furthermore, Australia's wealth, location and comparative stability have not catapulted it into the realm of geopolitical problems that attract the interest of Brussels and its active external policy (Ludlow 2001).

Conversely, the EU is a global power. Differentiating itself in an age of American unipolarity, the 'metrosexual' EU has been acclaimed as the era's 'soft power' (Murray 2005; Khanna 2004; Rifkin 2004; Padoa-Schioppa 2004; Ginsberg 1999: 432). Additionally, the economic and political might of the EU is unambiguously clear (Krauthammer 1991: 17). In 1999, the European market was worth more than A$13 trillion (Mazzocchi 2003: 34). The EU is the world's largest trader, representing more than 20% of international trade (Murray 1997: 230). The importance of such a considerable economic union is undeniable: the EU has been Australia's primary economic partner for the past ten years (Goldsworthy 1997: 29). EU investment provides an estimated 350 000 jobs in Australia (Lamy 2002a: 1). Furthermore, the EU is Australia's chief investor, providing 33% of total foreign investment in Australia (McDougall 1998: 108). The EU is the second major investment location for Australian funds invested overseas (Mazzocchi 2003: 34-5; Kenyon et. al. 2005: 56; DFAT 2003a, 2003b).

Raffin: Indivisible Partners or Enduring Combatants? Divisions and Triumphs in the EU-Australian

Relationship

1983: 221; Benvenuti 1999: 181). Whilst the Fraser Government's attachment of 'a disproportionate importance to the agricultural question' was understandable because of its predominance in the Australian economy (Benvenuti 1999: 182-3), the diplomatic handling of the disagreement 'merely impaired the already unsatisfactory relations with the EEC' (Renouf 1983: 330).

Signalling an unprecedented activism in international economic diplomacy (Kenyon et. al. 2005: 60), the more conciliatory approach of the Hawke and Keating governments furnished limited but encouraging success. Through the *Andriessen Agreement*, the EU indicated some willingness to submit its contentious policy to the rigour of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations (Murray 2005: 22). Additionally, Australia assumed leadership of the Cairns Group — a coalition of agricultural exporting nations that became a coordinated liberalising force in multilateral trade for a (Capling 2002: 153-70; Gallagher 1988: 2; Groom 1989: 3). The dialogue that emerged from this period led to a considerable broadening of relations between the EU and Australia (Elijah et. al. 2000).

Despite this progress, the CAP continues to strain the relationship. Since serving as Special EC Trade Minister in the Fraser Government at a time when Australia began to recognise the severity of the CAP's implications, John Howard has been 'unswerving in his attacks on EU protectionism' (Burnett 1983: 112-3; Howard 2003: 10-11; Murray 2005: 6). According to the Prime Minister,

> I have spent a large part of my political life denigrating, quite rightly, with some passion, the rotten anti-Australian policies of the EU that have done such immense damage to the agricultural industries of Australia and represent one of the high water marks of world trading hypocrisy (Kelly 1998: 13).

Recently, the EU and Australia have clashed over the EU's push for multilateral protection of geographical indications beyond the provisions on wine in the *TRIPS Agreement* (Vaile 2003: 2); the EU's campaign to gain greater WTO recognition of the 'precautionary principle'; the EU's Everything But Arms program (Lamy 2002a: 4); Canberra's endorsement of Uruguayan Carlos Perez del Castillo to become the next Director-General of the WTO (Murphy 2005: 6); the EU's sugar policies (European Commission 2005a: 3); the imposition of wheat subsidies (Sutherland 2005: 21); and the application of Australia's quarantine regime to the EU (European Commission 2003a: 1). The ongoing battles in the field of agriculture continue to inflict scars on the EU-Australia relationship.

Although the motivations of Australia's unrelenting opposition to the CAP are understandable, its often confrontational disposition has hamstrung the broader development of meaningful EU-Australia relations. Rather than dismissing Europe as a protectionist and domineering 'fortress' (Murray 2005: 8; Doody 2003), concentrating on the opportunities that the EU presents could yield momentous benefits. The EU represents an unrivalled economic bloc with 475 million consumers, distinguished by 'transparency and porous borders in economic transactions' (Murray 2005: 69). As Kenyon and Kunkel maintain, '[j]ust as Australia works to ensure that its trade relations with the US and Japan are not dominated by differences over agriculture, a similar approach could best serve its multilateral trade relationship with the EU' (Kenyon et. al. 20
05: 67). The balance of the relationship must revert away from reluctant indifference toward embracing Europe.

SEEING THE SAME WORLD, BUT DIFFERENTLY

As agricultural bickering persists, Australia and the EU also diverge in their varying views of the world. Although a cohesive EU increasingly acts internationally through a regionalist paradigm, the Prime Minister is intent on viewing Europe as 25 separate nation states. Howard, who has visited

fuelled transatlantic tensions (Afilalo 2002: 749). In stark contrast to his vehement denigration of the CAP, the Prime Minister has been subdued in response to the protectionist aspects of the Bush administration's agricultural policy (Davis 2002: 1; Parkinson 2002: 11). Whilst the Government is not entirely uncritical in its attitude to Washington,[259] divisions between the EU and Australia are amplified by the warmth of trans-Pacific relations.

AN UNCOOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENT

The EU and Australia are disunited over international environmental policy. Despite its 'formidable' commitment to the environment (Longo 1997: 127), Australia has opposed numerous global environmental initiatives that the EU has advocated (Lenschow 2004: 156). Largely motivated by the fear that ratification would adversely impact the economy, employment and investment (Papadikis 2002: 4; Oxley 2002: 11), Australia has consistently opposed the *Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*.[260] According to Murray, this rejection 'is a type of Cold War between the EU and Australia' (Murray 2005: 156). Beyond *Kyoto*, the EU and Australia have collided over the *Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal*[261] and the *Cartagena Biosafety Protocol to the Biodiversity Convention*.[262]

THE DEATH OF A FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

The gulf between the EU and Australia over issues like the environment is emphasised by the absence of a comprehensive Framework Agreement. The insertion of a human rights clause posed such an insurmountable obstacle for the Howard Government that efforts to secure an agreement were abandoned in 1997 (Murray 2002b: 66). The refusal to accept the clause, which appears in the EU's agreements with Cambodia, India and South Korea (Ward 2002: 179), downgraded the expression of the relationship to the *Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Union and Australia*. Although the Framework Agreement's failure has been partially 'counterbalanced by serious attempts on both sides to give flesh to the Joint Declaration' (Murray 2005: 148), the shortcomings of the *Joint Declaration* serve to illuminate the opportunities that were lost. According to Ward, the *Joint Declaration* 'is as rhetorical as it is succinct' (Ward 2002: 188). Funding of joint projects between the EU and Australia is more problematic (Murray 2005: 148). The *Joint Declaration* failed to establish any bodies to oversee its implementation and does not regulate the frequency and nature of ministerial consultations. Above all, a Framework Agreement could have laid the foundation for healing divisions in the EU-Australian relationship.

What About the Good News? The Diminishing Relevance of CAP

Despite the sources of division destabilising the relationship, the declining relevance of the CAP, the broadening of economic, political and social cooperation, the strengthening of regionalist interaction in Asia and the fundamental connection that forms cornerstone of the

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[259] Recently, the Coalition defied US efforts to dissuade the European Union from lifting its 15-year arms embargo on China, which Washington fears will transform the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. According to Sheridan, this was 'the most serious strategic disagreement between Washington and Canberra in recent years': Greg Sheridan, 'PM Defies Bush over China Arms', in *The Australian*, Sydney, 12 February 2005, p. 1.

[260] Opened for signature 16 March 1998, 37 ILM 22.

[261] Opened for signature 22 March 1989, 1673 UNTS 57 (entered into force 5 May 1992).

[262] Opened for signature 29 January 2000, 5 ILM 39.

Looking Beyond Trade

Cooperation between the EU and Australia beyond trade is augmenting and diversifying. In 1994, the *Agreement Relating to Scientific and Technical Cooperation* was signed, which promotes collaboration in 'bio-technology, medical and health research, marine science, the environment, and information and communication technologies' (Murray 1997: 240). Educational collaboration and exchange have been prioritised (Murray 2002a: 171). For example, the EU-Australia Pilot Cooperation Programme in Higher Education was established to facilitate institutional cooperation at postgraduate level (European Commission 2002: 1; European Commission 2004: 1). Furthermore, the EU and Australia are increasingly united by their evolving security dialogue (European Commission 2003b: 1). According to Romano Prodi, former President of the European Commission, '[w]e want to work closely with Australia on fostering democracy and human rights in the Pacific region' (Prodi 2002: 1). Murray has also observed 'shared visions regarding the need to confront challenges that go well beyond national boundaries, such as terrorism, and common concerns with both advancing and managing globalisation' (Murray 2005: 1). The periphery of the relationship's vision is broadening: Canberra and Brussels have cooperated on rural and regional policy (European Union 2005: 1), drugs in sport (European Commission 2000: 1), transport, development aid cooperation in the Pacific, and migration and asylum (Europa 2003). The historical obsession with the CAP is retreating as a new horizon for EU-Australian engagement arises.

Seeking Engagement Through Regionalism: Australia, Europe and Asia

In an era of 'competing regional capitalisms' (Coleman and Underhill 1998: 3), Australia has been divided from the EU because of its exclusion from regional architecture. The EU is a 'powerful regional bloc' that increasingly engages in inter-regional dialogue with other groups of nation states (Richards and Kirkpatrick 1999: 684). However, the regionalisation of engagement has long frustrated Australia because it is not part of an 'enhanced sovereignty arrangement' (Higgott 1998: 52). Australia is 'outside the loop of regionalism and institutionalised agreements' (Murray 2002b: 67, 71). Consequently, Australia suffers from insufficient opportunities to broaden the mechanisms for engagement with the EU (Murray 2002a: 155).

However, Australia can overcome this integration deficit by intensifying its presence and participation in the Asia-Pacific. Although the country has long grappled with its identity, disoriented in its transitional phase between Europe and Asia (Higgott and Nossal 1997: 169; Murray 2002a: 156; Huntington 1993: 22; Brett 1996: 187; Abbott 1991: 28; Milner 1996; Fitzgerald 1997), the contemporary project of regional integration undertaken by successive Australian governments is beginning to yield success. Initially, the Hawke and Keating governments enthusiastically propounded Australia's economic and security engagement with the Asia-Pacific (Milner and Quilty 1996). Canberra was instrumental in the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum ('APEC') in 1989. However, its broader effectiveness is contested, given its 'confinement to economic issues, to the exclusion of cultural and other imperatives' (Ward 2002: 178-9). Confident that Australia's destiny lay within the Asia-Pacific, the then Prime Minister Paul Keating promoted the compatibility of Asian and Australian values (Viviani 1997: 164; Evans and Grant 1995: 31; Sheridan 1995). His Government argued that its liberal pursuit of lower tariffs and deregulated financial markets would facilitate the expansion of links with the dynamic economies of East Asia (Bell 1988; Catley 1996; Maddox 1989; Singleton 1990; Garnaut 1989). In addition, Labor's emphasis on the importance of Australia's security within the region led to the establishment of the Association of South-East Asian Nations ('ASEAN') regional forum (Evans 1989); inaugural joint military exercises between Indonesian and Australian troops and the signing of a security agreement

Asia Strategy' (Commmission of European Communities 1995; Machetzki 1994; European Commission 1994), which advocated 'an increased emphasis on political dialogue, a new focus on economic cooperation and on enhancing mutual understanding, as well as for a continuation of development cooperation' (MacDonald 2002: 148). Europe's presence in Asia is partly motivated by the region's size and its rapidly growing economies (Dent 1999: 383). Asia is a larger regional trading partner for the EU than the North American Free Trade Agreement ('NAFTA') (McDonald 2002: 147). In 1996, East Asia took 8.2% of EU exports and provided 10.6% of EU imports (McDougall 1998: 117). Above all, Asian and European engagement is the logical consequence of the emerging significance and power of the two regions. Together, Europe and Asia represent two of the three poles of the geopolitical order (Soesastro 2002: 143).

The extent of EU-Asian integration illustrates the importance of further Australian involvement in the region. Although ASEAN and APEC have been less successful avenues for EU-Asian cooperation (Soesastro 2002: 143), the Asia-Europe Meeting ('ASEM') has been a particularly productive engine for advancing the relationship. Established in 1996, ASEM facilitates dialogue on political, security and economic isssues between the EU and the ASEAN countries and Japan, China and South Korea (Gilson 2004: 185). ASEM aims to 'realize and develop a concerted relationship in shaping the international order' (Soesastro 2002: 184). Its achievements are emblematic of the advancement of EU-Asian relations. The ASEM Trust Fund provides technical advice and training on financial sector and social policy reform. The Asia-Europe Environmental Technology Centre promotes cooperative research among environment scientists in the two regions.

Furthermore, the ASEM Business Forum promotes frequent dialogue between European and Asian investors. European Business Information centres have been established in many Asian cities, and the European Investment Bank has been active in supporting a number of aid programs in ASEM states, including the financing of natural gas projects in Thailand and Indonesia. Several Asian states benefit from the EU's Generalised System of Preferences, which provides a favourable importation regime for goods originating in developing states (Ward 2002: 183-4). Additionally, ASEM has pursued an early relaunch of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations to liberalise trade and investment between countries in Asia and Europe (Soesastro 2002: 143). Indicative of a broadening of relations, an Asia-Exchange Foundation (ASEF) has been created in Singapore to develop cultural interconnections.

Despite the widespread evidence of cooperation, recent examples of European indifference to Asia have highlighted the need for renewed engagement between the regions. The EU was inadequately represented at the ASEAN-EU foreign ministers meeting in Vientiane in December 2000 and the ASEM foreign ministers' meeting in Madrid in June 2002. At the fifth meeting of ASEM finance ministers in 2003, only one European foreign minister was present (Callick 2003: 12). Importantly, Europe recently invoked the historically divisive values discourse in response to Burma's membership of Asian-European institutions. However, periodic lulls in the advancement of the relationship are unlikely to arrest its advancement.

BUILDING THE BRIDGE FROM EUROPE TO ASIA

Not only can Australia enhance its relationship with the EU by becoming part of Asia's regional architecture, but it can overcome divisions in the relationship by facilitating Europe's relations with the wider region. This is reinforced by intermittent appearance of abeyance in the Asian-EU relationship. Whilst Australia's European identity may inhibit its fulsome Asian integration, its may also present Australia as an attractive investment destination for European businesses seeking to explore the Asia-Pacific region. Australia is a key trading partner and often plays a pivotal role in regional politics (Murray 2002a: 171). The Federal Government recognises this opportunity. According to *Advancing the National Interest*, the 'Australian Government is using its regular high-level contact, and the unique and valued perspective we offer, to encourage the European Union to remain productively engaged with East Asia' (DFAT 2003c: 105). This strategy appears to be yielding success. The EU recognises Australia's role and knowledge of the Asia-Pacific (Murray 2005: 213). In particular, the EU has benefited from Australia's

contemporary differences between Australia and the EU reverberate, but they will not destroy the foundation of the alliance.

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