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Aim of the Newsletter

The aim of the CESAA Newsletter is the dissemination of information on Europe and European Studies, information on visitors from Europe and information on conferences. The teaching of European Studies will also feature in the Newsletter and it is hoped that the members will be able to assist one another and collaborate on projects, conferences and publications.

Thank you to all those who have contributed so far to the newsletter. Contributions may be sent to Lilian Topic, Department of Political Science, Melbourne University, Parkville, Victoria, 3052.

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Contributions to the Newsletter are welcome!

Contributions relating to the following are especially welcome:

- * Articles on issues and current events in Europe.
- * News of the relevant disciplines involved in European Studies
- * News of forthcoming conferences and events, at local, state federal, or international level.
- * Reports of conferences on European issues.
- * The teaching of European Studies in Australia.
- * News of scholarships, grants and research funding for European studies.
- * Book reviews.

Deadline for Contributions to next Newsletter: February 1, 1994.

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The opinions expressed in articles which appear in the Newsletter are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Editors.

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CESAA welcomes new members

If you are a member and know of a friend or colleague who would be interested please pass on to them a copy of the membership application form. An application form is attached.

Application forms can be returned, with cheque payable to CESAA, to Lilian Topic, Treasurer, Dept. of Political Science, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Vic. 3052.

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C E S A A

Foreign Affairs in the European Community

by Etienne Reuter

This is a transcript of a talk given at Monash University, Melbourne City Centre on June 17 1993.

Domestic affairs in the European Community (EC) are, to some extent, the point of departure for this talk devoted to foreign affairs in the Community.

In the 1970s expensive oil jeopardized the development of the Community. The 1980s saw a reversal with the drive towards the 1992 single market without frontiers. Making use of this momentum we in the EC pushed the dream towards a single currency, towards political union. The goals are now fixed in the *Maastricht Treaty*, which also establishes a common foreign policy.

The foreign policy of the European Community is particularly resistant to analysis unless one knows the roots from which it sprang. The legacy of the past weighs heavily on the present, and will weigh heavily on the future. To look backwards will help us to look forwards, and to speculate about how the Community and its Member States will handle their relations with the rest of the world.

The way in which Community foreign policy is shaped is not very transparent, even within the Community. The clue to penetrate this labyrinth is a proper understanding of the tension between those who desire at all costs to preserve national sovereignty in the field of foreign affairs and those who believe that foreign policy can only be

effective, for what are at best second ranking countries in the new world order, if sovereignty is pooled and decisions are taken jointly.

The Origins of EC Foreign Policy

The true origins of EC foreign policy go back more than forty years. When North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel in June 1950, they raised the spectre of a third world war, this time pitting East against West, the Communist against the non-Communist world. If the Western world, especially Western Europe, was to be strong enough to ward off this threat, then ways had urgently to be found of rearming Germany, so recently a vanquished power. And this had to be done without creating alarm in France, which had been invaded by Germany three times in seventy years. Remember the rationale of the Community : to put an end to the Civil War between France and Germany and to rebuild the economies of Europe. After a narrow escape from the annihilation of our civilization by the Nazis, we now had to ward off the dangers of communist dictatorship.

Professor Morgenthau writes in "Politics Among Nations" : "The EC is a revolutionary attempt at solving an age-old political problem characterized by two basic facts. The natural superiority of Germany among the nations of Europe and the unwillingness of the other Europeans to accept that superiority". Maybe then the Community is all about drawing Germany into our

arms to disarm her.

The need to revive the German economy led to the Schuman Plan in May 1950, which was at the origin of the European Coal and Steel Community. The need to "re-arm" Germany led to the Pleven Plan in September of the same year. This imaginative scheme, put forward by the French government, provided for the creation of an integrated European army in which German military forces would be subsumed under collective European control. In spite of doubts expressed by some of France's European partners, the Treaty on a European Defence Community was signed in May 1952. It was meant to be accompanied by a draft Treaty on a European Political Community, which would have provided for a measure of democratic control through political institutions, and would have included foreign policy provisions.

This draft did not reach the stage of being signed, because in August 1954 the French National Assembly failed to ratify the European Defence Community Treaty. In the four years which had passed since the idea was launched, much had changed. The situation in Korea had become stabilised, and there were prospects that East-West relations might improve following the death of Stalin. Above all, the parliamentary situation was no longer the same. French governments were now obliged to rely on Gaullist support in order to command a majority in the Assembly, and this support was not forthcoming for the collective decision-making

in the field of foreign affairs presaged by the draft Treaty. The Gaullists preferred a *confederal* system whereby each Member State of the Community retained its autonomy.

These events of forty years ago bear a striking resemblance to what happened during the recent negotiations leading up to the Maastricht Treaty. Then, as now, there was a pressing external factor forcing the countries of Western Europe in the direction of integration. Then, it was the threat of imminent world war; at Maastricht it was the Collapse of the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and the apparent likelihood of Germany's reemergence as a Central European power. Then, as now, the ways put forward to deal with the threat were believed to be inoperable without much greater progress towards political union.

Then, it was in particular Italy which insisted on the addition of political institutions; in the negotiations preceding Maastricht Chancellor Kohl made it clear that, without strengthened democratic control through the European Parliament, he would not be able to guarantee the continued attachment of the German people to the Community ideal nor secure support for Economic and Monetary Union from the Bundesbank. Then, as now, reluctance to pool national sovereignty, particularly on security and foreign policy, caused difficulties over ratification. Then, the French National Assembly withheld its agreement, primarily over the national sovereignty question; after Maastricht, the narrow victory in the French referendum, the Danish "no" vote at the first time of asking, and the long

drawn out parliamentary procedure in the British House of Commons can all be ascribed, at least in part, to the same reason.

The first attempt to move towards a European foreign policy failed because France in particular drew back from sharing sovereignty. This position was strengthened by the coming to power of General de Gaulle in 1958. It should not be thought that General de Gaulle was *anti-European*. On the contrary, he was a *strong European*. He wanted a Europe which would be able to conduct its own foreign policy independently of the United States and in a way which would hold out some attraction to Western Europe's Eastern neighbours. But he wanted to do this while preserving national sovereignty. He therefore launched an attempt to construct a new Europe which would go beyond and indeed contain the institutions of the European Community, and be based on the ultimate authority and legitimacy of the Member States. The *Fouchet* negotiations which followed this initiative lasted throughout 1961 and 1962. They ultimately failed, just as the European Defence and Political Communities had failed, but this time because of opposition from France's partners. They did not like the anti-American thrust of Gaullist policy, they were afraid, with the United Kingdom still outside the Community, of domination by France in alliance with Germany, and they were suspicious of the attempt to supersede the institutions of the nascent European Community.

There was thus a stand-off: France would not agree to a more inte-

grated Community, and its partners, especially the Benelux countries, blocked any intergovernmental solution. Further development of the Community, and with it a European foreign policy, was therefore brought to a halt. The impasse was resolved after the departure from power of General de Gaulle. His successor, President Pompidou, in effect did a deal with the other members of the Community, at the Hague Summit in 1969. In return for allowing the United Kingdom to join the Community, Pompidou secured confirmation of the Community's agricultural regime and agreement to the introduction of foreign policy cooperation on broadly Gaullist lines. This was the beginning of European Political Cooperation, or EPC, which began to operate in 1970.

European Political Cooperation EPC

EPC, which is the machinery by which European foreign policy is formulated and implemented, operates to this day on the basis of *two fundamental principles*. These are the rule of consensus and the lack of supranational institutions. *The rule of consensus* means that no decision can be taken unless every Member State is in agreement. This is not quite so negative as it appears. It is not the same as a veto in a voting system, because the pressure on all participants to come to an agreement is great. These are diplomats sitting around a table, and a diplomat who fails to reach an agreement believes that he has fallen down on his job. There is an inherent dynamism in the system which produces results. It has its limits, however,

since the rule of consensus can on occasion produce aberrant results. The case of Yugoslavia provides two recent examples. Pressure from Germany obliged the Community to recognise Slovenia and Croatia earlier than most partners would have wished.

Had the decision been taken by majority vote, there would not have been a majority at the time. A big Member State can exploit the principle of consensus to make something happen. Similarly, Greece successfully prevented the Community from recognising the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia under the name of Macedonia, even though there was a large majority in favour. A small Member State can exploit the principle of consensus to stop something from happening.

The second principle of EPC is that *it has no supranational institutions*. The reason for this can be easily understood from the explanation I have given of its Gaullist origins, and the French camp was reinforced by the accession of the United Kingdom and Denmark, which on the whole took similar views. This meant not only that any idea of majority voting was excluded, but also that the Commission could not play in EPC the role that it had in the Community, namely the right to propose policies to the Council and to execute them.

Economics and Trade

Discussion of European foreign policy is invariably biased by excessive concentration on the classical forms of diplomacy, the sort

of foreign policy which is traditionally conducted by foreign ministries. This tends to overlook the other component of foreign policy, which is becoming ever more important in an interdependent world, in which the prospects for major armed conflict seem temporarily to have receded. European economic and trade policy is conducted, not through EPC, but through the European Community. Let us therefore go back to the European Community itself, set up in 1958. This extended the supranational method of the Coal and Steel Community to a wide selection of areas of economic activity, including external economic relations and a common commercial policy.

Why was it that concern over national sovereignty had blocked the Defence and Political Communities, but seemed to be of less account when it came to external economic relations? One reason could be that, compared with the "high politics" of traditional diplomacy, trade has always been less glorious and less noble, as any official in a Trade Ministry will confirm as he casts envious eyes at the gold braid and ostrich plumes of his Foreign Ministry colleagues. The Community wanted in 1958 to pool its commercial strength in a world in which Member States acting individually could no longer dominate international negotiations. The establishment of a common customs tariff and of a common commercial policy toward third countries entailed that it not only no longer made sense to maintain separate national commercial policies, but it was no longer technically feasible to do so. What this meant in practice was that the

Commission proposed and executed policy, but the Council decided it by qualified majority vote. According to Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome, the Commission conducts negotiations with third countries in consultation with a special committee appointed by the Council, which has come to be known as the *113 Committee*. It is made up of the Directors General for Trade from the appropriate Ministries in the Member States, who meet regularly once a month, and, at the level of their Deputies, once a week. The Committee has become an indispensable channel of communication between the Commission and the Member States, and ensures that there is close contact between the two on all aspects of trade policy.

Independent trade policy is a myth

It is a myth that the Commission conducts an independent trade policy. Both the wording of the Treaty and the administrative arrangements which have been made ensure that it operates within the framework of the policy guidelines which have been adopted by the Council, that is by the Ministers of the Member States. The strength of the Commission, and of the Community system, comes from its exclusive right of initiative, which allows it to set the agenda and to engage in forward planning, and its exclusive right of negotiation, which ensures consistency in the presentation of policy.

Agreements with third countries

In addition to the common commercial policy, the Treaty of Rome also provides for the conclusion of

agreements with third countries or international organizations. The areas in which such agreements may be concluded are continually increasing, since it is part of Community jurisprudence that, when a common policy is agreed within the Community, the Community has the power to conduct a common external policy in the same area. The application of this principle is complicated by the fact that very often Member States retain powers concurrent with the Community, although not as regards trade policy, which means that agreements have to be concluded with both the Community and the Member States. This adds to the lack of transparency in Community foreign policy-making. It reflects the fact that the Community is in a transitional phase between national and collective decision-making, with no guarantee as to when, if ever, the transitional period will come to an end. It makes life difficult for third countries.

The Community's powers under the Treaty of Rome were nevertheless considerable, and led to energetic policy-making in an increasing number of areas. In 1962 Association Agreements were concluded with Greece and Turkey, and these were followed by other countries in the Mediterranean Basin. The Yaounde Agreement, which set out the basis for development cooperation between the Community and the countries formerly closely associated with its Member States, was concluded in 1962, and was followed in 1975 by the first of the Lome Conventions. From the beginning the Community, through the Commission, took an active part in the various GATT

rounds. Following the enlargement of the Community in 1973 its external relations activities significantly increased. It was admitted as such to the Western Economic Summits.

The Commission established a dense network of Delegations in third countries and to international organizations. From a mere handful in the early 1970s, the number has swollen to over a hundred, performing duties broadly comparable to the Embassies of the Member States, with the exception of consular functions.

The Commission and Political Cooperation

While this development was taking place, the Commission still had little more than a toehold in Political Cooperation. At first Member States, at the insistence of France, tried to exclude the Commission completely. This proved impractical, since EPC rapidly found that it wished to extend its activities to areas which were the responsibility of the Community.

The first example came immediately, as the Member States worked out the position they wished to take collectively in the discussions then beginning on the CSCE. France took the view that the Conference would be dealing mainly with security questions, not Economic ones, and that no contribution from the Commission was therefore required. This rapidly proved illusory, and the Commission had to be admitted to provide the indispensable technical expertise on the so-called "Basket

11" dealing with economic cooperation.

Likewise, when France launched the Euro-Arab Dialogue, it was with the idea of engaging in an exclusively political exercise which did not concern the Commission. The United States made sure, for its own reasons, that the political Dialogue originally intended by France did not take place, and EPC was therefore thrown back on an economic Dialogue, for which again the Commission's contribution was indispensable.

The Commission's formal position remained unchanged until the change of government in France in 1981. President Mitterand's new Foreign Minister, Claude Cheysson, had suffered too often as a Member of the Commission from his institution's formal exclusion from EPC to allow France's traditional policy to continue, and he gave immediately instructions for the Gaullist ban to be lifted. In October 1981, the Commission became fully associated with political cooperation.

But the most significant element then was that a number of tools of foreign policy required Commission involvement. That is true particularly of the only real weapon available in peace time, that is to say trade sanctions.

Sanctions

The declaration of martial law in Poland in December 1981 required a firm response in the form of sanctions against the Soviet Union. These were applied through a

Council Regulation, which according to EC law was immediately applicable in all the Member States. The procedure adopted became a model for similar occasions. Consensus in EPC was followed by a proposal from the Commission to the Council and adoption by the Council according to EC rules. just a few months later, the same procedure was followed when Argentina invaded the Falkland islands, and again in 1985 and 1986 when sanctions were applied to South Africa, and in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. On each occasion the Commission had a special role to play, as a bridge between the EPC and EC frameworks, which it was able to do because its representatives alone were present in both.

The Commission's role was not, however, confined to the imposition of sanctions. It also had an important part to play when EPC needed to have recourse to Community financial instruments for the furtherance of its policies. Although the budget is adopted by the budgetary authority, that is Council and Parliament together, it is prepared and executed by the Commission. So when, for example, EPC wished to increase Community aid to Central America as a political gesture and as part of a political strategy, or when it wished to accompany sanctions against South Africa with positive measures to assist the victims of apartheid, or when it wished to grant aid to the Palestinian inhabitants of the Occupied Territories, or to the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, it was obliged to turn not only to the Community budget but also to the Commission as the drafter and

executor of that budget. This brought the machinery of EPC and the Community closer together, and gave the Commission the beginnings of a policy-making role even in the traditionally reserved areas of foreign policy.

The process gathered even greater momentum as a result of the earth-shattering events of 1989. As the Berlin Wall came down and the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe fell one after the other, the European Community had to make a rapid response both for itself and on behalf of the world Community. International recognition of the Community's responsibility was given when the Western Economic Summit at the Arches in July 1989 asked the Commission to coordinate international assistance efforts for Poland and Hungary, later extended to other Central and East European countries. The Community's own considerable aid effort, the coordination of international aid, and the negotiation of EC agreements with the countries concerned all demonstrated the importance of the Community's role and the responsibility of the Commission for formulating and executing policy on its behalf. This changed the nature of the Commission's association with political Cooperation. The Commission became an essential partner, without whom the Member States could not adequately deal with the grave problems with which they were faced.

A common foreign and security policy

These developments encouraged the concept of a genuine common

foreign and security policy which was established in the Maastricht Treaty to be defined and implemented by the Community's institutions and its Member States. The *objectives* of this policy are :

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union
- to strengthen the security of the Union and the Member States to preserve peace and international security
- to provide international cooperation
- to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law and human rights.

The *means* are systematic cooperation and joint action in areas where we have common interests

The *Council* will define common positions to be taken up in international organizations, such as the UN security Council. Those of the Member States who are represented defend the common interest and EC positions.

As to the *procedure*: the Council decides on Joint action and will decide whether the action is governed by majority rule or not. The CFSP includes work on common positions or defense and military aspects. The Treaty incorporates the W.E.U. (Western European Union) but also stresses that the CFSP will be mindful of obligations and specific national interests such as (Nato etc.)

The *Presidency* represents the EEC for the needs of the CFSP The Parliament will be consulted on main aspects but this appears rather

vague. There is a right of initiative : any *Member State* or *Commission* can refer an issue to the *Council* (Commission fully associated) There are also *Emergency Procedures* (48 hours procedures).

In *reality* : what this amounts to are relatively limited changes in procedure, and the possibility of far-reaching cooperation on security and defence matters in the future if the *Member States* so chose. On the procedural side, the distinction between EPC Ministerial Meetings and the meetings of the EC Council will be abolished, the EPC Secretariat will be merged with the General Secretariat of the Council, and the Commission is given a non-exclusive right of initiative in EPC. These are all steps in the direction the integrationists wished EPC to go, but they each had their limitations. In spite of the EPC-EC merger at the level of Council and Secretariat, the intergovernmental method used by EPC remains intact. A modicum of majority voting will be introduced, but it is so hedged about with conditions that it seems unlikely that it can ever be put meaningfully into effect. The Commission's *non-exclusive right* of initiative is also an important *step forward*, but it does not give it the same powers it has in the Community. Under EC treaty, the fact that only the Commission may make a proposal gives it the power to shape the agenda and engage in forward planning. The Maastricht Treaty does not give it this power in the future CFSP.

Thus the CFSP is seen as the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty. The first one is the Economic and

Monetary Union, consolidating and developing the original endeavours of the Community. The third one is the common work on domestic affairs such as immigration, legal cooperation, law enforcement, necessary for the smooth operation of the single market without frontiers.

Internally or on the administrative side the Commission has given itself a tool for implementing this embryonic common foreign policy. This is the new Directorate General for External Political Relations.

Prospects for European foreign policy

What then are the prospects for European foreign policy when the Maastricht Treaty comes into force, and what will the implications be for third countries, like Australia? The first thing to remember is that the European Community has come a long way since the days, little more than twenty years ago, when the only external policy it had was exclusively Economic.

Greater relevance : Now, the attention given to the positions taken by the Community and its Member States, for example in the United Nations, and the enthusiasm with which third countries seek a Political dialogue with the Twelve, are proof of the success of the enterprise. And this has been achieved through the intergovernmental method, safeguarding the national traditions and decision-making capacity of each Member State. This achievement will be maintained and further built on.

Complexity! The gradual sharing of sovereignty will continue, as new ways are found of taking decisions collectively.

The pressure for greater integration with Community procedures will be maintained. A new conference is due to be held in 1996. The CFSP may go forward, or the status quo may be maintained, but *the Community cannot go back*.

Dangers ahead

But there are two dangers ahead, and one difficulty is still unresolved. The dangers both stem from the success of EPC. The first is the fact I mentioned earlier, that EPC is in great demand. Practically every country in the world is anxious to have a political dialogue with the Community. Some want it for the substance, others for the form. Whether formal or substantial, the dialogue is equally time-consuming. The problem is that EPC has renounced institutions. The future European Union will be represented externally by the Presidency, as EPC is now. All its activities are carried out by diplomats who have full time jobs in the Foreign Ministries of their own countries. Many of them simply do not have the time to devote to the increasing demands of EPC during the period of their Presidency and of the preceding and succeeding Presidencies when they are involved in the activities of the Troika. As external interest in EPC and soon the CFSP continues to grow, the Community's foreign policy mechanism risks collapsing under its own weight.

The second danger comes with enlargement. One of the drawbacks of

consensus is that it works less efficiently the more participants there are. A Community of Nine took longer to reach a common position than a Community of Six, and a Community of Twelve longer than one of Nine. The Community is now engaged in negotiations with four countries seeking membership, and if all goes well they could join at the beginning of 1995. The common view is that enlargement of the Community to sixteen members will not require a significant overhaul of existing institutional arrangements. That may or may not be so; what is certain is that any enlargement beyond that, which is bound to come at some stage, will require major institutional changes, including in the way the CFSP is formulated and carried out.

Implications for third countries

Here then is the first implication for third countries. The Community's foreign policy arrangements will remain opaque, dispersed and troublesome to follow for some time to come. You will be puzzled by the way decisions are taken, and you will find it difficult to predict what the decisions will be. This is unsatisfactory, but there is little that can be done about it. Changes of this magnitude, which involve the very fibre of a nation's being, cannot be brought about overnight.

I mentioned that, in addition to two dangers, there was one difficulty still unresolved. This is the fact that, in spite of the progress that has been made in bringing together EPC and the EC, so that Community instruments can now be more easily used for foreign policy purposes, eco-

nomic policy itself, and particularly trade policy, is still largely unaffected by political considerations. This is because the trade policy-making machinery remains separate. Different officials are concerned with it, both in the Commission and in Member States, and they operate in a traditional trade policy ambience in which the primary input comes from industry. Only at the level of Ministers can there be arbitration between political and economic considerations, and by then it is usually too late. An example of this is the Community's anti-dumping procedures, which have a quasi-judicial status. Political interference in the procedures would be violently rejected. Contrary to popular belief, this is on balance an advantage for the third countries concerned, which enjoy certainty that trade policy measures will not be misused for unrelated political ends.

Implications for Australia

And so let me conclude by saying a few words on what this means for Australia. We have good and bad relations with you. Often the difficult bits in trade relations are left to the Community while the more positive aspects of relations with Europe are put to the credit of Member States. That is what we call the 'Scapegoat' factor. But you, as other third countries, must appreciate how busy we are organizing ourselves, implementing the Maastricht Treaty in particular and that therefore we appear rather introvert. That does not mean that we are not interested. Indeed as to the big issues, we are generally on the same wave length. That is particularly the case for human rights.

There is a pragmatic and efficient side to our relationship. We have regular bilateral ministerial meetings. We have concluded good agreements on wine appellations and oenological practices. We continue good and mutually profitable work on industrial cooperation, on standards, on scientific matters, on technology. I know that the CAP is not very popular in this country, but we buy a lot of wool from you, your wine exports to the EEC have increased by 2000 % in 10 years, we agree on the necessity to ban hormones. Above all we are really on the same side of the table in OECD, in the GATT talks also.

So, the Community is a fact on the map of the world in 1993, it plays its part and will continue to do so in a world seeking a new order. All this will remain part of political and commercial reality, despite our complex institutional structure and complicated procedures.

You, in Australia, will have to live with it, deal with it! There is no point in crying in despair and anger : "Whom do I call in Europe ?" as US-Secretary of State Kissinger did. Just call Brussels! and redial!

*Etienne Reuter
Citizens' Europe Directorate,
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Re-imagining the Community: Sovereignty and Symbolism in the EC

by Matt Harvey

This is an extract from a paper given to the Modern Europe conference at La Trobe University 5-9 July 1993. The author may be contacted c/o Centre for European Studies, Monash University, Clayton 3168.

"Bonfires herald a New Europe" says a report of the celebrations ringing in the first year of the Single Market ¹. Indeed, a thousand bonfires were lit across the EC in celebration of the Single European Market. But there was no dancing in the streets. Perhaps as the Single Market was no more than the culmination of thirty five years of effort, it was not nearly as much of a breakthrough as the fall of the Berlin Wall. Also, the Single Market did not seem to be bringing any relief to the EC's double digit unemployment and barely detectable economic growth. If the EC would not bring the riches everyone had been promised, what was the point of it?

When things go badly in a state, people tend to blame the government, rather than the state itself. It would be easier for the EC if its citizens had a sense of solidarity and community not purely dependent on economic outcomes.

What is the EC? "A sui generis international organisation"; "an economic bloc"; "a new legal order"; "a quasi-federation". These are not the sort of things people dance in the street for or, as Benedict Anderson suggests, die for ². A united Germany, a free France, a Greece trying to prevent a slavish province stealing its heritage - that

is what gets people onto the streets or fighting and dying. Must the EC be something people will dance or die for in order to capture the hearts and minds of the people of Europe?

The Name

One possible key to a greater sense of identification and loyalty lies in the name, which is finally what it ought to have been years ago: the European Community. The European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, the European Atomic Energy Community - these are not communities that bring any warmth to the heart, but the European *Community* could, if its people could see it as an entirely new political entity, as something not grafted on top of the member states but made by its citizens. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union has now clouded this vision by retaining the Community but creating a supervening "Union" with separate functions and stating that it is the Union which will have citizens.³

Sovereignty

The EC has no "sovereignty". Sovereignty is a very emotive subject. It is hard to define, but it is what states have. Most are insistent that they have not "surrendered" any to the EC, but have rather "pooled" it with the other Member States. In some cases, this is necessary because the national constitution forbids surrender of sovereignty. If sovereignty is, theoretically at least,

absolute power, what does the EC have? Instead of sovereignty, it has "competences". Much of its law is made through directives which must be implemented by the Member States. Its authority is thus remote and difficult to understand. The Maastricht Treaty continues in this vein. It makes little sense unless accompanied by the Treaty of Rome. Even then, it is neither an easy nor an inspiring document. There are no memorable quotes. How many French, Irish and Danish citizens read it or understood it before voting on it? There is clearly a need for a more comprehensible constitution, but there is a more pressing need for an atmosphere of European solidarity in which such a constitution can be created. How can the EC create such a sense of "Euroloyalty"?

Imagined Communities

In "Imagined Communities", Benedict Anderson argues that the nation states we know today have been made possible by changes in people's perception of their society, space and time. By a combination of this changed perception and the judicious "invention of tradition" by elites, there came to be "imagined communities" of people who, although they cannot see most of their fellows, can imagine them as part of the same community, the same "nation", now embodied in a state, for which they are prepared to fight and die as they fought for family, tribe, city, prince or religion in the past. Clearly the EC's development has

not been the same as that of the nation states which comprise it. Indeed, the EC has been a consciously anti-nationalist construction, its advocates depicting nationalism as the scourge of the twentieth century. EC officials can be heard to denounce anti-integration arguments as "nationalist" in a pejorative tone. Yet nationalism has been the most successful mobilizer of public opinion in modern times. It has certainly been more successful than class and religion. Can the EC make any use of this phenomenon? Can it convert nationalism to supranationalism of a positive kind? The European Council of Fontainebleau in mid 1984 established the ad hoc Committee on a People's Europe, ("the Adonnino Committee") consisting of representatives of Heads of State and Government⁴. This committee recommended enhancing people's awareness of their "EC citizenship" by making free movement of citizens easier, through exchange schemes, use of mass media, and creation of recognisable symbols. Many of its recommendations were embodied in the Single European Act. It emphasised the need to foster a sense of European identity based on the benefits of the Community to the citizen. In the section "Strengthening of the Community's image and identity", the report makes recommendations on the adoption of a flag and an anthem, together with a request for common European stamp issues by national postal authorities.

The Passport

The EC passport is perhaps the most visible emblem of the EC

citizen. A burgundy coloured EC cover bearing the twelve stars is now used on almost all member state passports. Inside, however, there is still a member state passport. I am told that on entering the United States, when the flight attendant comes down the aisle asking for "EC passports", EC citizens do not respond: they still think of themselves by their nationalities. The impression of solidarity must be somewhat reinforced at EC entry points, where the two gates are "EC Passports" and "Other Passports", but the effect does not seem to have gone deep.

What form of union?

If the EC has decided not to be nationalist, what has it decided to be? A certain body of opinion, of which a leading exponent is Baroness Thatcher, holds that the EC should be a purely economic entity, creating full freedom of movement between the member states, but leaving political and cultural life undisturbed. Holders of this opinion sometimes invoke "founders' intention" that there be no political component to the Communities, but there is abundant evidence that the founders always intended political union to result from economic union - and indeed attempted political union before the EEC treaty.⁵ While economic union seems to be about the one thing in the EC on which there is broad agreement, it seems clear to all but the most hard-core free marketeers that some form of political integration is necessary to regulate the single market properly. What form political union should take is hotly debated, but there is at least a broad consensus

that it should exist. It is also widely acknowledged that political union requires some sense of solidarity, which brings us back to the need for an imagined community.

I will now examine the attempts made by the EC to establish such a community and the problems faced by such attempts.

The Unknown Soldier

The first symbol of nationhood Anderson examines is the Unknown Soldier. The EC can have no Unknown Soldier as it has no army. A Common Foreign and Security Policy has always been a goal of integrationists and is a specific goal of the Maastricht Treaty, but the EC has shown little inclination for war. The EC sent cease-fire monitors to Yugoslavia any of whom might have become its first soldier to die in the line of duty, but this did not happen. The EC has been keen to be seen as a mediator rather than taking sides. The EC plans to expand by voluntary means rather than through military annexation. It cannot rely on military glory to inspire loyalty. It might rely on "trade wars". The present standoff with the United States over GATT and the perception of "unfair" competition from Japan may foster a sense of Community solidarity in opposition to the rest of the world.

The passage of time

Anderson's exposition of time in nation building is too complex to explore in detail here, but time does have two very important dimensions in the EC. The first is that it is a dynamic body, moving

towards the horizon of "ever closer union". The EC is not like those states which purported to be the culmination of millennia of history and which could now simply exist into an indefinite future. The EC is always a piece of unfinished business. More than any nation, its destiny is mapped: a twelve year transition to the Common Market, a five year progress to the mystical "1992" and now (despite the unexpected delay) an intricately timed path to monetary union some time just before the millennium, together with a further constitutional review in 1996. At the same time, there is a programme for broadening, with the "class of '94", the "class of '96" and the "class of 2000". The EC marches towards its destiny with the sense that all problems can be overcome in time. The second aspect of time is that despite its 2,000 kilometre span, the EC operates in only two time zones - with ten of the twelve in the same zone. This must help not only with business but also to create some sense of shared existence - although working hours vary greatly, no doubt accentuating the sense of cultural difference.

Language

As Anderson points out, a primary source of the creation of solidarity is the use of a common language. Once there is a common language, there is a "community of communication". One member of the community can be understood by all other members of the community. The use of a common language at an official level in the EC has been strenuously opposed in the cause of maintaining national cultures. Destroying the language rips at the

fabric of the state. As can be seen by Ireland, the United States, and many other ex-colonial states, a unique language is not necessary for a strong sense of nationalism, but it clearly helps. On the other hand, as Belgium and Canada demonstrate, language borders within a state can lead to bitter division. The EC works in English and French, and knowledge of at least these two languages is an effective prerequisite to working in the EC institutions, but the EC has nine official languages, with the use of Irish and Letzburgesch also permitted in some circumstances. It is a mockery of all the EC's drives for efficiency when everything has to be translated into so many languages. It is particularly so when many of the EC politicians who insist on such translations are quite sufficiently fluent in the original language. Of course, the translations are necessary so that all EC citizens can understand its deliberations, but it leaves the citizens very much at the mercy of the translators. M. Delors can give sound bites in English, French and possibly German, but he does not have time to do all nine. If there is to be an EC polity, there must be a common language, but no one in a position of power is seriously advocating this. Ironically, the EC, with its "acquis communautaire", "subsidiarity" and "direct effect" may be in the process of developing a new language ("Eurospeak"?) - not one likely to inspire poetry.

An obvious effect of the diversity of languages is the lack of common media. This has enabled the substantial protection of national media monopolies from the single market on the grounds of protec-

tion of culture.

Thanks to market forces, English is the common language of Europe although national pride will presumably never allow this to become official. There are two powerful groups opposed to this: those who do not speak English and fear it will destroy their national language and those who speak several languages and appreciate the power this gives them. These latter are the people to whose benefit the EC has worked best to date. Their advantages would be substantially reduced by a common language. While a common language appears to have disadvantages from a cultural point of view and to discriminate against monolinguals, these difficulties can be overcome. Everyone can learn a second language at school - it is already compulsory throughout the EC. Learning a second language does not destroy your culture. If all important business was conducted in the official language, the national language might die, but most business would continue to be domestic and I suspect national languages would survive very well. As alternatives to English, French seems to be fighting a losing battle. German will no doubt gain ground as the Community expands north and east, but has disadvantages as a *lingua franca*.

The EC frequently uses Latin as a standby language for neologisms: it has the advantage of being the basis for four of the present Community languages, with substantial input into three of the others, it has magnificent literature and, symbolically, was the language of the most unified period of European history. It has much to rec-

commend it but alas, support seems lacking. Esperanto is sometimes mentioned but has never really caught on. One ingenious suggestion aired recently was SerboCroatian⁶. Apart from making refugees from the former Yugoslavia immediately employable and assisting the war ravaged new states to get on their feet, this would smooth the admission of the other slavic states and would not offend the national pride of the existing member states. It would put everyone at an equal disadvantage. While there is the immediate problem of which alphabet to use, this is a surprisingly good suggestion, but again unlikely to be acted on.

Lack of a common language enhances the importance of non-language symbolism. In the EC, this means that nonlanguage trade marks will be particularly potent. The Community Trade Mark is nearly a reality. "Eurobrands" may become as symbolic of the EC as Coca Cola is of the United States although paradoxically it seems to be nonEuropean brands which have made the most of the panEuropean symbol market.

Language is obviously an important instrument of culture, but what of the non-verbal media: music and painting? Flemish paintings and Italian music are accepted as "European" culture. They are not seen as encroaching on national culture. Books can be translated and films subtitled but seem somehow forever national. Indeed, who will fight for "European" culture? Once it is seen that Rubens was inspired by Caravaggio, Mozart commissioned all over Europe,

their work can be seen as "European culture" to fight for. New culture in the new Europe can also be "European" and worth fighting for.

A symbolic capital

"Symbolic capital" is a key asset of a state. Readily recognisable symbols which inspire loyalty and solidarity are valuable. France has the Eiffel Tower, Versailles, the Louvre, Marianne; Britain - the Queen and the Houses of Parliament. What has the EC got? The EC is often known as "Brussels". The Belgians do not seem terribly happy about Brussels being taken over by the EC, but at least there is good money in it. Ironically, Brussels is the most bitterly disputed territory in a bitterly divided country. Just the place to foster European unity! Capitals are clearly an important matter: twice this century the victorious allies have attempted to impose a capital on Germany. Now that it is free and unified for the third time, it has voted once again to return to the highly symbolic capital, Berlin. The EC, unlike any other polity, has no official capital. Unlike Spain, which has summer and winter capitals, the EC has three temporary capitals which are all bitterly cold in winter. The Commission is firmly entrenched in Brussels, where it can get on with its work. The Council is a moveable feast, shuffling between the capital of the incumbent presidency, Brussels and Luxembourg. The Court is comfortably, if rather remotely, in Luxembourg, the Parliament has its committee meetings and some of its plenaries in Brussels, its support staff in Luxembourg and

some plenaries in Strasbourg. This is not a recipe for comfortable, leisurely deliberation. It reinforces the image of the Parliament as a political football rather than the epicentre of EC political legitimacy. The EC does not have a capital where it can accumulate symbolic capital. It only has niches in Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg. In Brussels, it has the Berlaymont, the very model of modernist, slightly futuristic, bleak, insular efficiency. When I visited it in November 1992, it was, symbolically, closed for the removal of asbestos. Now it is the subject of dispute over its refurbishment. The Berlaymont serves as a very accurate symbol of the EC, although perhaps not the symbol it would want. The role of a building in symbolising sovereignty should not be underestimated. Consider: "the White House", "Downing Street", "the Elysee". "The Berlaymont"?

Various other large blocks in Brussels house the EC, none of them very inspiring. The EC complex in Luxembourg is purpose-built, giving some idea of the founders' vision. The Council building is a singularly ugly tower block. The Court has a certain modernist charm, and the symbolism for a Coal and Steel Community of being built with old rails, but it is not exactly splendid.⁷ It has been extended into the ground rather than visibly. The Hemicycle in Strasbourg is a splendid building, enhanced by the countless flags flying outside. Unfortunately the flags are of the Member States of the Council of Europe, a separate organisation. The building is the Council of Europe's building, bor-

rowed by the EC. Even the EC's flag and anthem are borrowed from the Council of Europe, with its full approval.

While logic suggests that Brussels should be the sole capital, national interests will not allow it. Strasbourg and Luxembourg cling to their valuable institutions. The Belgians might object to all institutions being situated in Brussels. As the Community expands northward and eastward, it might be thought that a capital closer to its centre would be appropriate. Bonn has tentatively been offered as it is soon to be vacated, but this has met with little enthusiasm. Frankfurt is another possibility. It is the probable site of the European Central Bank and it might be advisable to have the other institutions nearby. For a truly symbolic capital, Aachen, as Charlemagne's capital, has some attraction. Or what about neutral territory - Geneva! There is also the possibility of Brussels becoming the "European Capital Territory". This would solve both the EC's need for a "neutral" capital and Belgium's perennial problem of what to do about Brussels, but there is no support for this idea by either Belgium or the Community institutions.

The flag

The flag is often thought to be the key symbol of a state. The EC and various organs of it used a variety of flags before settling on the circle of twelve gold stars on a blue field. Ironically, among the flags used was the flag of ancient Macedonia! There was also the white stylized "E" on a green field known as "Churchill's underpants". The

issue was debated in the European Parliament in 1983. Mr Von Hassel stressed the need for "clear, plain, and above all, uniform symbols" for the EC. He extolled the virtues of the twelve stars. Twelve is a symbol of perfection: the zodiac, the months of the year, the apostles etc. It is notable that at that time the EC had only ten members, although by the time the flag was officially adopted on 29th May, 1986, the EC conveniently had, and still has, twelve members. This has led a lot of people to believe that the twelve stars stand for the twelve member states. They do not, and there are no plans to change the flag on the accession of new members, as has been necessary in the United States. This is a pity as alternative arrangements of a larger number of stars have lots of interesting possibilities. The twelve stars are an effective and popular symbol, adapting well to a variety of media and fitting conveniently into a square or a circle, while leaving room for something in the middle in particular applications. Indeed, the Adonnino Committee proposed that the "European E" be located in the circle but this was not eventually adopted.

It is also the flag of the Council of Europe, a very different organisation. Can a flag really serve two organisations? What does the flag say? Stars are a common motif on flags - although interestingly not on any other Member State flag. The five pointed star is a popular symbol in the communist bloc and in the Islamic world. The circle is a powerful symbol, but what does it signify here: a closed circle? a vicious circle? a circle of perfection? One striking use was in a

Danish documentary on illegal immigrants in which the circle of stars metamorphosed into a circle of barbed wire. Given the recent clamp-down on asylum seekers, this symbolism is appropriate for "Fortress Europe".

The currency

One element of sovereignty not explored by Anderson, but which has loomed very large in recent EC debate is currency. I will not here go into the arguments about monetary union but simply observe that a coin or note is a visible and powerful manifestation of the state. The ECU is a brilliant compromise between French history, an English acronym and German monetary policy - a perfect EC solution. How much British opposition to a single currency is economic, and how much sentimental about loss of the pound? In an attempt to minimise sentimental concerns, it has been suggested that Member States will be able to design and mint their own ECUs. This provides scope for designers to depict their country in Europe rather than pure symbols of Europe. Anthropomorphised images of the state are very popular on coins. Europe has the figure of Europa, likely to be a widely used. She is an excellent symbol of the EC.⁸ Another possibility would be the head of Jean Monnet.

The anthem

Another element of statehood is the anthem. The EC adopted the Council of Europe's anthem in addition to its flag: the "Ode to Joy" from Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. The words to the Ode are

said to have been inspired by Rousseau's treatise on the abbe de St Pierre's project for European unity⁹. Exceedingly rare for an anthem, the tune has been adopted without the words. This means that Europeans cannot sing along, enhancing their sense of solidarity, but at least this avoids the need to use a language.

The EC has made conscious attempts to foster a "European" identity, through the Adonnino Committee and elsewhere, now expressed in legal form in the Maastricht Treaty as "Union Citizenship". This is not so much a new status but, rather like the passport, a collection of old rights in a new package. National citizenship is retained, indeed it is the source of Union citizenship. The new citizenship does not give much or require anything. It has been suggested that such citizenship would be more meaningful if there were European duties as well as European rights, but what might these duties be?

Other areas

Other areas suggested by the Adonnino Committee include media, education and sport. I have discussed media earlier. Education is an area jealously guarded by the Member States and their component units. The EC has done much to create student exchange schemes such as ERASMUS, but it cannot play a significant part in curriculum development. Anderson documents the enormous role of education in fostering national identity. The Community does not have this opportunity to foster Community

identity, except marginally through exchange schemes.

Racism

The greatest potential source of European unity but at the same time the least desirable is racism. Anderson demonstrates how race played a large part in the development of national consciousness among colonized peoples through their consciousness of difference from the coloniser. Europe does not have the problem of dispossessed indigenous inhabitants, but now has the problem of ex-colonial immigrants and "non-European" refugees and economic migrants. The huge influx of impoverished slaves from the east has not occurred as feared, although EC member states have largely closed their borders to refugees from the war in former Yugoslavia. The main source of immigrants of a visibly different "race" is the Maghreb. Turks and Gypsies are also visible. It is all too easy to equate "European" with "white skinned" thus making all those without white skins "foreigners" - regardless of their citizenship. With many millions of "non-European" citizens and residents and a clamp-down on asylum seekers widely perceived as racist, Europe faces a racial crisis. "European race" is seen by many as a distinguishing characteristic of the vast majority of EC citizens and a potential source of solidarity, but one which must not be used.

The existing European nationalities are likely to be less durable than their skin colour. Perhaps the best source of unity would be not

ERASMUS, but a giant programme of intermarriage: "HAPSBURG". With enough intermarriage, there will eventually be a "European nation". Europeans probably do not want to wait that long. I suspect that mobility of goods, services and capital will be greater than that of people - at least on a permanent basis. Even in a common European home, there is no place like home, so regional differences are likely to persist, especially given the policy of language and cultural maintenance.

A sense of history

One of the greatest resources denied to the EC is history. Although Rome, Byzantium, the Holy Roman Empire and the reign of Napoleon serve as previous models of European unity, they are not particularly desirable models. The EC is self-consciously a new structure although it proceeds on the mystique of a "European unity" perhaps subconsciously based on racial and religious solidarity but usually expressed to be based on shared values of liberalism, tolerance and democracy. This has two problems. The first is that Europe's history is predominantly one of bitter division and war. There is no history of glorious European union to draw on, except the last forty years: where the EC is really revolutionary is in trying to put centuries of history aside in favour of a unity which is completely new. All this while striving to preserve the "rich" cultural variety which has caused and perpetuated the historical conflicts. The second problem is that "shared European values" are also shared by many

other areas of the world, notably North America and Australasia. These can be coopted as "of European origin", but they subvert the concept that the values are exclusively "European". Also, they are essentially the luxuries of prosperity: it has been wrenching to see the people of the former eastern Europe discovering that democracy alone does not buy you prosperity. What really makes the EC stand out from its neighbours (apart from the members of EFTA) is that it is more prosperous than they are. It is likely that not only eastern Europe but also the Maghreb would put up with democracy in return for admission to the EC feast. Excluding them may be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Conclusion

I have sought to explore the possibilities for the fostering of solidarity in the EC on the lines explored by Benedict Anderson as the tools successfully used to foster nationalism. Although the EC is not attempting to be a state, that it is not sure what it is trying to be makes the task all the more difficult, but it must foster solidarity to create a popular and legitimate basis for integration. I have explored the emotive nature of "sovereignty" as the visible and imaginable manifestation of power and the need for

the EC to tackle this problem of spirit and imagination. For the reasons outlined, progress towards political union will continue to be a difficult process until the EC can appeal to the irrational as well as the rational.

- 1 Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher *EC Brief*, 4th January, 1993.
- 2 Anderson, B. *Imagined Communities* 2nd edition, London, Verso 1991 p53.
- 3 Article 8, *Treaty on European Union*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1992.
- 4 Report of the ad hoc Committee on a People's Europe, *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement 71* 85, p29.
- 5 The European Political Community was in draft form when the European Defence Community Treaty was rejected by the French Assemblée Nationale in 1954.
- 6 "The European" 20-23 May, 1993.
- 7 Compare the gargantuan but classically magnificent Palais de Justice in Brussels - for Belgian use only.
- 8 with the bull representing the Common Agricultural Policy?
- 9 Heater, D. *The Idea of European Unity* Leicester University Press, London 1992 p85.

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The European Community's Foreign Policy

The Institut für Europäische Politik in Bonn has recently launched the pilot edition of its Newsletter "EPC/CFSP Forum". It will offer world-wide a regular forum for all those who are interested in questions and topics related to European Political Cooperation and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It plans to deal with current EPC/CFSP policies and the international challenges the Twelve EC member states have to face.

"Specific topics will be discussed, conferences will be summarized and research projects shall be presented. Furthermore the reader will find useful information about books and EPC-related documentation."

Interested academics are invited to contribute to this Newsletter and to participate in the discussion about EPC/CFSP.

For further details contact the Institute at:

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Forthcoming conferences, symposia, seminars, lectures, and calls for papers

Chronological summary of items

			1993
Conference:	National Self-Determination Today: Problems and Prospects Centre for Slavonic and East European Studies and for Comparative Studies of Law and Culture Macquarie University	Sydney, NSW	6th to 7th Nov
			1994
Call for papers:	Inaugural Conference- Europe 2000: Economics, Politics, Law and Culture European Community Studies Association of New Zealand University of Auckland	Auckland, NZ	14th to 17th Feb.
Conference:	Citizenship and National Identity CESAA	Melbourne, Vic	25th March
Call for papers:	ECSCA-Europe European Community Studies Association Second ECSCA World Conference : Federalism, Subsidiarity, and Democracy	Brussels, Belgium	4th to 6th May
Conference:	International European Studies Conference Central Europe: Emerging Business Opportunities Swinburne University of Technology	Hawthorn, Vic	11th to 13th July
Conference:	Institutionalising Europe: Memory, Administration, Power Griffith University	Brisbane, Qld	13th to 15th July

National Self-Determination Today: Problems and Prospects

**Macquarie University
Centre for Slavonic and East
European Studies
and
Centre for Comparative
Studies of Law and Culture**
November 6 - 7 1993

The Centre for Slavonic and East European Studies and the Centre for Comparative Studies of Law and Culture announce a conference on *National Self-Determination Today: Problems and Prospects* to be held at the School of Law of Macquarie University (W3A Library, Room 626) on 6 and 7 November 1993.

Saturday 6 November 1993

SESSION I

10.00-10.30 am

Ross Poose

Macquarie University

Nationalism: The Last Rights?

10.30-11.00 Ephraim J. Nimni

University of N.S.W.

Title to be announced.

11.00-11.30 Discussion

11.30-12.00 Coffee

SESSION II

12.00 - 12.30 Adrian Jones,

La Trobe University

*The Competing 'Selves' in Human
Self Determination, Past and
Present*

12.30.1.00 Ben Tipton,

University of Sydney

*Nationalism and Economic De-
velopment in Nineteenth Century
Europe*

1.00-1.30 Lunch Break

SESSION III

2.30-3.00 Adam Czarnota, Mac-
quarie University

*Nationalism and Legality in Post-
communist East Europe*

3.00-3.30 Cathy Lowy, La Trobe
University

*Legal Transformations in Hungary
as a function of conceptions of
Nationhood*

3.30-4.00 Peter Radan (Sydney)
*Secessionist Self-Determination:
The Cases of Slovenia and Croatia*

4.00-5.00 Discussion

Sunday 7 November

SESSION IV

10.30-11.00 AM Fedor Median-
sky, University of N.S.W.

National Minorities and Regional

Security: The Hungarian Experience

11.00-11.30 Vera Ranki (Sydney)
From under the red Varnish old pictures emerge: the revival of nationalism in post-communist Hungary.

11.30-12.00 Discussion/Coffee

12.00-12.30 David Christian, Macquarie University and Marat Durdiev, La Trobe University
Legal Transformations in Hungary as a function of conceptions of Nationhood.

12.30-1.00 PM Zlatko Skrbis (Flinders University)

The interrelation between self-determination and Nationalism: its effects upon second generation Croats and Slovenians in Australia

1.00-1.30 Discussion

1.30 Close.

Registration fee: \$5 (both days)

For further information contact:

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**CESAA
Citizenship and National
Identity in Europe
Melbourne
Friday March 25th
1994**

CESAA is planning a symposium with the theme of *Citizenship and National Identity in Europe*. It plans to explore what these issues mean in contemporary Europe. The symposium will be held in Melbourne and will give CESAA members, experts in the field and members of the general public an opportunity to hear analysis from a wide variety of speakers. There will be a chance for questions, responses and discussion following each presentation.

Members will be posted more information as it becomes available. To express interest or offer suggestions contact:

Dr. Philomena Murray,
President, CESAA,
Department of Political Science,
University of Melbourne,
Parkville. 3052.

**Institutionalising Europe:
Memory,
Administration,
Power**

**Griffith University
13 - 15 July
1994**

A conference entitled *Institutionalising Europe: Memory, Administration, Power* and will take place at Griffith University from 13-15 July 1994. It is to be hosted by the School of Contemporary European Studies at Griffith University in collaboration with The Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia.

The key themes around which we hope to organise discussion are:-

- * Using the past: the politics of memory
- * Manufacturing 'Europe': the social organisation of knowledge
- * Administering composite polities: the EC in historical perspective
- * Preventing violence: the reconstruction of internal and external security
- * Making money: power and identity in European finance and trade
- * Changing party systems: new cleavage, new rules
- * miscellaneous

For more information please contact:

Dr. David Moss, School of Contemporary European Studies, Griffith University, Queensland, 4111
Fax 07 8757730

**Call for papers and
registration of interest
International European
Studies Conference
Central Europe:
Emerging Business
Opportunities
Faculty of Business
Swinburne University of
Technology
11 - 13 July 1994**

Central Europe now attracts the attention of the business world as a very promising, quickly changing, significant trading and industrial area. With Poland and Hungary having already associate member status of the European Community, and all four countries aiming for full membership within this decade, this region may become both a direct source of profitable business and a strategic bridgehead into Europe for some Australian companies. Benefits may be substantially amplified by the advantageous geographical position of the region, market access to both Western and Eastern Europe, relatively low labour costs, complementarity of numerous Australian and Central European industries and companies as well as incentives for overseas businesses provided by the governments of all those countries.

Renewed interest in European affairs is reflected in this major European Studies Conference, to be run in July 1994 by the Faculty of Business of Swinburne University of Technology, conveniently positioned in the vicinity of the City of Melbourne. Whilst having a very practical business focus and aims, this conference has also the capacity to contribute to the relevant theories of international eco-

nomie relations and international competitiveness. It will provide for a stimulating encounter between business people, policy makers and academics, whose expertise lies in the domain of international economic relations in general and, in particular, between four countries of Central Europe and Australia. The conference will:

- * examine new business opportunities for Australian companies that result from the emergence of the new market economies of Czech Republic, Hungary, Republic of Poland and Slovakia,
- * look at cultural, economic, technological and legal obstacles that impede a faster growth of trade and limit the variety and intensity of business contacts between Australia and the four countries,
- * propose solutions to some problems and, perhaps also,
- * lead to further analysis in the theory of international economic relationships and the theory of international competition.

The conference has been endorsed by Austrade, the Australian Senior Trade Commissioner in Warsaw, Mr Tony Clegg and commercial consulates of the interested countries in Australia, as well as by the President of the Australia-Poland Chamber of Commerce, Mr Tony Macken. It has attracted substantial interest from Warsaw School of Economics (WSE), resulting in this university's partnership in the conference. Several Colleges of that School have already committed themselves to the conference, and interesting papers are expected from a number of their academics of in-

ternational standing. A similar interest is anticipated from leading universities of the other three Central European countries. The conference is taking place with the encouragement and support of the Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia (CESAA) and of some Australian universities. Finally, a number of Australian companies, either already involved in business with Central Europe, or contemplating establishing some forms of relationships with companies from that region, have already expressed their wish to participate.

The scope of economic, political and social changes happening in that region makes it an ideal research object for a comprehensive investigation of the impact of attitudes, beliefs, management approaches, other systemic factors as well as of their mutual interrelationships on the international performance of Australian businesses. It is hoped that the geographic focus of this conference may attract more action oriented business people from Australian companies that think of extending or intensifying their international activities.

The conference will also contribute to the results of the current general debate involving Australian academics and business people, concerning internal factors that have prevented many of this country's industries from gaining a stronger international competitive position and have substantially limited the benefits Australia obtains from its international business.

A particular stress will be put

on explaining the very modest current presence of Australian businesses in Central Europe. Bringing together academics, business people and policy makers from all involved countries and creating a useful platform for comprehensive comparisons and discussion of many varying perspectives and opinions may help further demystify and explicate some of the underlying problems. By focussing on some aspects of international business and selecting an area that comprises only four, homogeneous enough, countries of Central Europe, this conference may produce some concrete, applicable suggestions as to the resolution of some concrete international business problems and, at the same time, contribute to the relevant economic and business theory. Attempts will be made to ensure that both macro and micro issues get adequate attention whilst the latter are discussed in a narrow context of carefully selected industries.

Why Swinburne ?

Melbourne is home to seven universities: University of Melbourne, Monash, Latrobe, Deakin, Victoria University of Technology, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology and Swinburne University of Technology (SUT). In trying to stimulate the need for, and show the likely benefits Australia may draw from its wide opening to the rest of the world and from intensifying the political, cultural and economic cooperation with it, all those universities have recently developed and intensified their various interests in international studies.

Swinburne is a member of a three-part consortium, now into the third year of a four-year, highly successful Australian government sponsored training program for middle-level managers from Central and Eastern Europe (Australian Program of Training for Eastern Europe - APTEE). Through this program, Swinburne has had a wonderful opportunity to learn about political, cultural and economic aspects of the turbulent transformation of Central and European countries from the APTEE trainees. The intensity and comprehensiveness of this exchange has been a major intellectual challenge and has nurtured some new insights and research interests with Swinburne academics, most notably demonstrated by students and academics exchange agreements between SUT and Warsaw School of Economics as well as ample prospects of joint research.

In line with its traditional strengths in applied business studies, and in response to the trainees' needs, Swinburne concentrates on the improvement of the managers' understanding of market based economics with the view of enhancing trade opportunities between Australian companies and companies from the participating countries. The program also encompasses a two months' work placement undertaken by the trainees in Australian companies relevant industries.

Deadlines

Registration of interest from participants & authors 25 June 1993

Receipt of paper abstracts (max. 250 words) 29 October 1993
 Invitation to submit the paper 12 November 1993
 Draft paper submitted 28 January 1994
 Notification of acceptance 15 February 1994
 Camera-ready copy obtained 27 May 1994

Paper submission

Authors are encouraged to return their Expression of Interest form by 25 June. On acceptance of the abstract, authors will be invited in November 1993 to submit a draft of their paper to enable completing programming the conference, as well as introducing changes to the papers, when recommended by the Conference Committee. All papers must be in English and should be limited to a maximum of fifteen A4 pages (single spaced), including figures, tables, diagrams and references. Each copy of the draft paper must include a title page, which contains the title of the paper, the abstract, author's name, affiliations and complete addresses of all authors with telephone and facsimile numbers. In the case of more than one author, the name of the author who will present the paper should be indicated. All papers obtained by 27 May will be published prior to the conference; should any authors find themselves unable to deliver their paper by that deadline, they will be requested to bring 20 copies of it with them.

Review criteria

Paper selection criteria include relevance to the theme/topic of the

conference, degree of originality of ideas, clarity and quality of the presentation.

The Conference Program

In order to attract more academics and students, Conference Committee has decided to introduce a differentiated fee schedule. It is expected that the registration fee for the whole conference inclusive of reception evening, lunches daily, twice daily tea/coffee, conference dinner and conference proceedings will not exceed:

- for university students
A\$ 90 reception evening, conference dinner and conference proceedings excluded
- for full-time academics
A\$ 450 all inclusive or
A\$ 300 exclusive of reception evening and conference dinner,
- for others A\$ 600

The conference fees may be lowered should the registered interest exceed the anticipated level.

Enquiries

All correspondence relating to the Conference should be addressed as follows:

The Conference Committee"
"Central Europe: Emerging Business Opportunities"
Faculty of Business
Swinburne University of Technology
John Street
Hawthorn, Vic., 3122 Australia
Phone: (Int.: + 61 3) 819 8056
Facsimile: (Int.: + 61 3) 819 0949

Commission of the European Communities - University Information
ECSA-Europe European Community Studies Association
2nd ECSA-World Conference
Federalism, Subsidiarity and Democracy
Brussels, May 4 - 6 1994

Call for Papers

Proposals for papers (maximum 2 pages) should be based on specific national experiences or on theoretical arguments. They should be intended to provoke comparative debates and to clarify problems related to the institutional development of the European Community. Papers, based specifically on the EC experiences, are also invited. Subjects should fall within the framework of the following nine specialised groups.

1. The Federal Experience: Historical and Comparative Analyses
2. Economic Constitution I: - Fiscal Federalism; Central Banks, currencies and Economic Convergences
3. Economic Constitution II: - Subsidiarity and the Welfare State, the Public Sector and Subsidiarity
4. Citizenship and Federations: Regions, Nations and Wider Identities.
5. Institutional Structure: Federalism and the Courts
6. Institutional Structures: the Democratic Deficit
7. Implementation of Community Policies and the Principle of Subsidiarity: Comparative Ex-

periences.

8. Integration Theories: Subsidiarity and Federalism
9. External Dimension of Federalism and Subsidiarity

Not all papers can be discussed but all papers will be circulated.

For information contact:

Prof. Malcolm Anderson
c/- Commission of the European Communities

DGX/University Information
(Mrs. J. Lastenouse)

200, rue de la Loi (T120 4/12)

B - 1049 Brussels

Tel: 32-2-299 9454/299 9293

Fax: 32-2-296 3106

Centre for Soviet and East European Studies
University of Melbourne
Seminar Programme
Second Semester 1993
November 1993

Mon Nov 8

Dr. Stephen Fortescue, Politics, University of NSW. Industry Policy in Post Soviet Russia: Various proposals and programs.

Mon Nov 15

Dr. Marina Mironova, Melbourne University.

The Deportation of the Russian Intelligentsia in 1992.

Mon Nov 22

Ass/Prof. Stephen Wheatcroft, Melbourne University. The Soviet Famine and the World Food Crisis of 1946/47.

Mon Nov 29

Prof. Archie Brown, (Director of the Centre of Russian and Eastern

European Studies, Oxford University). Russian Politics after Gorbachev.

Venue: Room 111, CSEES, 135 Barry St., Carlton.

Time: 6.30pm

For more information contact Anne on 344 5956.

**European Community Studies
Association of New Zealand
Inaugural Conference
Europe 2000
Economic, Politics, Law and
Culture
University of Auckland
14-17 February 1994
Final call for papers**

The conference will focus on current and future developments within the European Community, and their implications both for Europe itself and the outside world, including New Zealand. The conference is multidisciplinary in character and covers the relevant issues from economic, political, legal or cultural perspectives.

Overseas key-note speakers include:

Mr. Peter Schmidhuber, Commissioner, European Community, Brussels.

Professor Rheinhardt Rummel, Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik, Ebenhausen/Isar.

Professor David Mayes, National Institute for Economic and Social Research, London.

HE Dr. Dietrich Hammer, Ambassador and Head of Delegation of the Commission of the EC to Australia and New Zealand will open the conference.

The programme will also include speakers from the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Bulgaria, and Australia, as well as from New Zealand.

In view of the number of late expressions of interest we have decided to issue a further and final call for papers. Proposals, including abstracts (up to 200 words) and a brief biographical note (up to 100 words) should be submitted at the latest by 15 November 1993. A draft programme, details of accommodation arrangements and registration forms will be circulated promptly after that date.

Offers of papers, and requests for information should be sent to the conference organisers:

Mia Mikic and Robert Scollay

Economics Department

University of Auckland

Private bag 92019

Auckland, New Zealand

Phone: 64-9-373 7599 extension 8312, 8717, or 7661

Fax: 64-9-373 7427

E-mail:

m.mikic@comu3.auckland.ac.nz

r.scollay@comu3.auckland.ac.nz

**The Australian Institute of
International Affairs (Vic)
Meeting
October/November 1993**

Venue: DYASON HOUSE

124 Jolimont Road

East Melbourne

Non-members of the AIIA are welcome to attend

Wednesday November 3

Luncheon Meeting 12.15-2.00pm

The Landscape After the Battle:
The Outcome of the Polish Parliamentary Elections

Dr. Janina Frentzel-Zagorska

Dr. Janina Frentzel-Zagorska has taught sociology at the University of Warsaw and chaired research sections of the Centre for Public Opinion Research at the Institute of Culture in Warsaw. Since migrating to Australia in 1983, she has lectured on Polish politics and history in the School of Modern Languages at Macquarie University, and has worked as a senior research fellow in the Institute of Advanced Studies at the Australian National University.

Dr. Frentzel-Zagorska has published many articles and books in both Polish and English on culture and politics, especially in Central-Eastern Europe. She has recently edited and co-authored a reader, *From a One-Party State to Democracy: Transition in Eastern Europe*.

Two Conference Reports - Rewriting the German Past? Literary and Historical Interventions 1989 - 1993

Report No. 1

*by Peter Monteath
History Discipline
Flinders University
of South Australia*

This conference was the result of the cooperation of the History and German Departments of the University of Western Australia, who were interested in establishing a forum for the discussion of the most recent developments in a united Germany. More specifically, the conference was to provide a focus for an examination of the implications of unification for the re-writing of German history.

Fortunately the conference organizers were able to secure generous funding from a number of sources - the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Western Australia Professor Fay Gale, the university's International Centre, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the Goethe Institute. With this funding it was possible to attract a number of overseas speakers, most notably the key-speakers Konrad Jarausch (North Carolina) and Reiner Pommerin (Dresden) as well Thomas Anz (Bamberg), Siegfried Hoyer (Leipzig), Johannes Becker (Marburg), Dieter Welz (Rhodes) and Hans-Jochen Marquardt (South Africa). In addition, there were delegates from all the Australian states.

After an official opening performed by the German Consul General, Mr. Hans-Georg Fein, Konrad Jarausch delivered an ad-

dress which established the parameters for the remainder of the conference. Jarausch discussed the potential ramifications of unification for German historiography. Although there exists a danger of a re-nationalization of historical interpretation, Jarausch is not pessimistic about its impact. He considers it an inevitable accompaniment of recent political developments which might be fruitful in sponsoring a renewed interest in neglected areas of the German past, for example in German democratic traditions dating from the nineteenth century. The historicization of the uglier aspects of the German past, most notably the Holocaust is inevitable, but need not be viewed sceptically and will not necessarily be accompanied by a return to national chauvinism. Instead, Jarausch views positively the opportunity for German history to embrace the pluralism of western historiography, which can accommodate a re-adoption of the analytical category of the nation, but can also be open to substantive and methodological impulses from such areas as social history, women's history, cultural studies and approaches informed by poststructuralism.

A more sceptical view of the impact of unification on German history was delivered by Peter Monteath, who undertook a case study of the fate of one particular, formerly East German History Department, namely that at the University of Jena. The case study revealed the eagerness with which Germany's new masters closed

down the old department, rendering most of its members jobless, and established a new department along the lines of the West German model. A first-hand account of the fate of Leipzig's History Department was received from its present director Siegfried Hoyer, one of the survivors of the recent turmoil in the university system.

Other historical papers dealt with such diverse topics as the growing xenophobia and right-wing radicalism in contemporary Germany (by Edilbert Rajadurai), the role of the Church in the collapse of the GDR (John Moses), and the nexus between the question of national identity and the decision to relocate the German capital to Berlin (Reiner Pommerin).

There were a large number of papers dealing with responses by intellectuals to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the creation of a united Germany. The most common single subject of investigation was the writer Christa Wolf, about whom Thomas Anz, Manfred Jurgensen and Judith Sallis gave papers. Ernst Keller spoke on Heiner Mueller, Dieter Welz on Gabriele Goettle, Margaret Stoljar on Jurek Becker. Peter Morgan and Alison Lewis addressed the problems confronting German intellectuals in the construction of a national identity, while John Milfull, in asking "What's Left?", examined the dilemma of the intellectual left in the wake of the demise of eastern European socialism and the triumph of liberal capitalism. Making reference to the work of a number of

rightwing intellectuals, Reinhard Alter identified the emergence of a new conservatism in German intellectual life which has accompanied the implosion of the GDR. Happily also there were a couple of contributions which discussed non-literary media. Roger Hilman discussed recent films on Germany by Ophüls and Godard; Lee Kersten analysed a television series titled "Motzki".

To promote the bringing together of historians and germanists, a panel on which both disciplines were represented was arranged for the afternoon of the first day of the conference. Panelists (John Milfull, Li Veit-Brause, Konrad Jarausch and Thomas Anz) were asked to discuss the topic of German "Streitkultur". The unification of Germany was preceded by the so-called "Historikerstreit", or historians' dispute, which was indicative of a conservative tendency to relativize the Nazi past and to deny the centrality of the Holocaust experience. Shortly after unification occurred the so-called "Literaturstreit", which was provoked by a vehement attack by a number of critics on the person and work of Christa Wolf. Although separated by the collapse of the GDR and the unification of Germany, these disputes are both indicative of a continuous development towards a new conservatism in German intellectual life, possibly of a generational change marking the waning influence of the '68 generation.

The consensus seems to have been that the interdisciplinarity of the conference led to a fruitful ex-

change of ideas. Reports of developments in the historical realm appear to have been confirmed and supplemented by observations from the cultural or intellectual sphere. It is hoped that this fruitfulness will extend to the publication of a selection of the proceedings in the near future.

Report No. 2

by Assoc. Professor
Irmeline Veit-Brause
School of Social Inquiry
Deakin University

The unification of the two post-war German states three years ago poses challenging questions for a re-assessment of German history. The twenty-two papers by historians, political scientists and literary scholars, presented at this conference, revolved around such issues as the tasks for historiography, the critical (re-)examination of highly acclaimed literary works of GDR writers, artistic and media-effective representation of the unification experience, select aspects of the unification process (e.g. some prominent attempts to understand and to level in the psychological chasm between East and West, or the restructuring and 'evaluation' of East German universities, the role of the church in the GDR), or alternative conceptions for a democratized GDR which were overtaken by the events. In all these informative and fascinating papers the central issue was a search for new critical standards and conceptual frameworks in the light of

which 'the state of the nation' might be best analyzed.

For some specialists in GDR literature, it was also an occasion to examine their own 'utopian' visions of 'democratic socialism' projected onto the GDR and its most outstanding literary representatives, like Christa Wolf or Heiner Müller. Not surprisingly, the latest work by Christa Wolf *Was Bleibt* which caused quite a notorious literary-political controversy in Germany in mid 1990 was taken as a prompt to examine the question of 'What's left' a pun on 'What remains?'

No doubt, this joint examination of a whole range of facets of the German condition after unification was greatly helped by the distance from the inner German controversies. It made it easier to avoid the extremes of a 'catastrophic' or a 'celebratory' discourse. Yet, here too, it would be too much to say that individual perspectives converged in a shared assessment of past continuities in German political culture or future prospects.

Conference Report: Economy and Culture

by Walter Veit*

From October 1 - 3, an international conference with the theme "Economy & Culture" took place in the Training Centre of Ernst & Young, International Professional Services, Melbourne. The conference was organized by Associate Professor Walter Veit and Ms Helen de Cieri for the Centre of European Studies of Monash University, in conjunction with the Monash University Graduate School of Management and the Monash-ANZ Centre for International Briefing.

H.E. Dr. Franz Keil, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany and Professor M. Logan, Vice-Chancellor of Monash University spoke at the opening of the conference which had attracted some ninety participants from industry, business, administration and universities.

The organisers were financially supported by sponsorships from the Allen Consulting Group, the Australian German Association (AGA), the Commission of the European Community, Coopers & Lybrand, the Department of Business and Employment - Victorian State Government, the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ernst & Young, the Ethnic Communications Pty. Ltd., the German Research Foundation (DFG), the Goethe-Institut Melbourne, Lufthansa German Airlines, Monash University, Robert Bosch (Australia) Pty. Ltd., Siemens (Australia) Ltd., and the Ukrainian Studies Foundation in Australia.

H.E. Dr. Dietrich Hammer, Ambassador and Head of the Delegation of the Commission of the European

Community introduced the conference theme with a paper on "The cultural dimension of European integration" stressing the underlying and persisting cultural and linguistic diversity in the present and future member states of the EC.

Twenty-two speakers from Eastern and Western Europe and Australia analysed the relationship between international industrial and commercial activities on the one hand and national cultural identities on the other in a broad variety of contexts. These ranged from basic questions like "European identity - does it exist?" (C. Leggewie, University of Giessen), "The family likeness of the population of European countries" (E. Scheuch, University of Cologne), "Australia and Europe" (I. Haig, Monash-ANZ Centre for International Briefing), and "The place of post-socialist countries in a future Europe" (E. Freyberg, Warsaw School of Economics), to business oriented problems which were addressed from a management psychology point of view, e.g. the "Stability and change of work-related values in an intercultural perspective" (B. Wilpert, Technical University of Berlin), "The culture shock in post-communist societies during market transition: Ukraine's perspective" (Y. Poluneev and J. Zagoruiko, PollyCorp, Kiev and Ukrainian Academy of Sciences), "Culture, organisations and change" (A. and L. Bodi, Monash University), "Constructing the World: the plain person's representation of the economy" (A. Wearing, Melbourne University), and "Cultural constructs and the management of organisational culture" (M. Knowles, Monash

University). Other speakers considered the cultural dimension in specific issues like "Privatisation in Central Europe" (D. Charles, Allen Consulting Group), "Tax policy in the United Europe" (W. Horec, Coopers & Lybrand), "Simplification and complexity: the dilemma of economic theory" (R. Tietz, University of Frankfurt), and "Do cultural traditions explain the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community?" (D. MacLaren, Melbourne University).

The intercultural dimension of the theme was addressed from an Australian point of view in papers like "The culture of a dependent economy, or: The economy of a dependent culture?" (D. Horne), "Critical forces shaping Asia" (K. Badenoch, Department of Business and Employment), "Australia between Europe and Asia: our linguistic and communicative assets" (M. Clyne, Monash University), and "The role of language in management training" (P. Dowling, University of Tasmania and H. de Cieri, Monash University). Finally, M. Mruck (Science Centre, Bonn) gave a systematic and historical outline of the organisational culture of funding research in the sciences and humanities in European countries. The organisers plan to publish the conference proceedings in the near future. Inquiries should be directed to the author:

* Associate Professor Walter Veit
Department of German Studies
& Centre for European Studies,
Monash University, Clayton
Vic. 3168,
Tel. 5652244
Fax. 565 5251

Courses and research on European Studies

This section of the Newsletter gives information on new or recently commenced courses and research on European Studies.

The **Register of European Studies** is being compiled by Craig Lonsdale at the Department of Political Science at the University of Melbourne for the CESAA in order to provide information on courses currently being taught in Australia and research being carried out on European Studies. The questionnaire is attached to this Newsletter. So far CESAA members have supplied information on 133 courses or subjects. Please return forms with information on courses to:

Lilian Topic
Department of Political Science
University of Melbourne
Tel. 03-3446565
Fax. 03-3447906

The London School of Economics and Political Science

Master's Course in European Social Policy

A new specialist one year taught course for students whose interests lie at the European level, and for those whose careers will involve co-operation with other member states.

Core Courses:
the origins of structures of Euro-

pean welfare states; contemporary social issues and the implications for further European integration the social policies of the European Community.

Plus an option from:
Social planning; Planning health services; Income Maintenance personal social sciences; housing and urban planning; education; deviant behaviour

Plus an option from:
Post-war European history; Economics of EC organisation; European Institutions (International Relations; Public Policymaking in Europe

Plus a dissertation of about 10,000 words.

The course is wide-ranging and multi-disciplinary and is taught within the Department of Social Science and Administration with the co-operation of the Departments of Economics, Government, International Relations and International History. The Department of Social Science and Administration has a staff of some 25 full-time teachers and admits over 100 new students each year to a variety of postgraduate courses.

For full details contact: The Graduate Admissions Office, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom. Telephone 01-405-7686.

The course is primarily intended

for candidates in the early stages of, or looking towards, careers as practitioners, planners and administrators of public services whose interest lies at the European level and for those whose work is likely to involve cooperation with other member states. Equally it is designed to meet the needs of those interested in careers in teaching and social research with a European perspective.

Closer economic union in the Nineties will have growing political and social consequences at both national and Community level. The MSc focuses on the comparative study of current and emerging social problems and the range of social policies being developed, with special attention being paid to the implications for harmonisation of social policy and the role of the Commission consequent to 1992.

The MSc course is multi-disciplinary and cross-national comparative study in its integrating feature. Students gain a thorough grounding in the comparative analysis of the institutional arrangements of European welfare states, as well as examining specific social problems shared by individual countries and the issues involved in further integration. They also study welfare state models outside the EC (eg. Sweden) in order to widen their understanding of social policy options available. Their studies are complemented by the choice of a European option taught outside the Department: either in economics, Government, International Rela-

tions or International History. In addition, students may choose an option in a specified field of social policy. They are also required to submit a wide range of other graduate courses. Students are allotted to individual tutors who supervise work on the essay topic.

There are no field work requirements as such, but students should assume that the dissertation will involve work either in libraries or in the field, and that some of this work must be done during the vacations. An optional research visit to the EC headquarters at Brussels is offered. European links for students are strengthened by an annual cross-national student conference with partner universities on specific aspects of the implications of harmonisation, such as social security, the position of women in changing labour markets, demographic problems. Currently the participating universities are the Universities of Amsterdam, Bielefeld, Athens and Paris I. In addition the Department is host to a regular Cross-National Social Research Seminar with invited speakers from the UK and continental Europe.

The Goethe Institut
Goethe-Institut Melbourne
606 St Kilda Road, Melbourne,
Victoria 3004, Australia.

Telephone (03) 510 8838, (03) 510 3214
 Facsimile (03) 521 2912

Cultural Cooperation

The Goethe-Institut organizes and promotes a wide range of cultural activities together with Australian institutions and part-

ners through:

- * Experimental, documentary and feature films
- * Concerts and workshops and classical and contemporary music, jazz, pop, and rock
- * Theatre productions, dance and ballet performances
- * Documentary and fine arts exhibitions
- * Workshops and lectures.

Language teaching and learning
 One of the Goethe-Institut's primary tasks is to promote German language teaching in other countries. It forms close links with educational institutions, universities, associations of German language teachers and institutes of adult education in the host country.

At its centres worldwide and at its 16 centres in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Goethe-Institut offers a variety of German language courses at all levels. It also organizes special language courses for professional people who need to use German for their work. Summer courses for young people combine learning German with a varied program of leisure, social and sporting activities.

Library: The opening hours of our library are as follows:

Monday	10.00am-6.00pm
Tuesday	10.00am-6.00pm
Wednesday	12.00pm-8.00pm
Thursday	10.00am-6.00pm
Friday	Closed

Contemporary European History

Edited by Kathleen Burk -
Department of History,
University of College London
&
Dick Geary - Department of
History, University of
Nottingham.

Contemporary European History, published by Cambridge University Press, offers readers a fresh innovative approach to twentieth-century European history, in its broadest sense. Encompassing Eastern and Western Europe (including the United Kingdom), and covering the period from about 1918 to the present, *Contemporary European History* achieves both range and depth. *Contemporary European History* publishes articles covering major areas of history - political, diplomatic, cultural, social and economic articles covering the smaller as well as the larger European states one issue per year devoted to a topic of central interest to contemporary historians, book reviews, abstracts in English, French and German a Noticeboard section in each issue, covering diverse areas of interest to all in the historical profession an annual critical survey of the twentieth-century history journals published by a particular European country.

Forthcoming contents

The First British MEPs: Styles and Strategies - Caroline Jackson
 The Holocaust in Romania: The Iasi Pogrom of June 1941 - Radu Ioanid

The Politics of Statistical Information and Economic Research in Communist Hungary, 1949-1956

- Gyorgy Peteri

Manufacturing Consensus in Nazi Germany - David Welch

The Long Fifties: Socialist Parties and Programmes in Britain, France and Germany - Carl Cavanagh Hodge

The Report of the 'Three Wise Men' - Edmund Dell

The November 1993 issue of *Contemporary European History* will be on the theme of "Divided Europe - Divided Germany"

The Guest Editor will be Gustav Schmidt.

For further information:

Journals Marketing Department,
Cambridge University Press,
FREEPOST,

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 1BR, UK.

Tel: 44 (0) 223 325 806

Fax: 44 (0) 233 315 052

Feminist International Relations

The International Studies Association's Feminist Theory and Gender Relations section now has an e-mail network FEMISA for exchange of course information, bibliographies, ideas and forthcoming activities. To join FEMISA, you need an electronic mail account, and send this message:

sub femisa your name [eg. sub femisa Jan Jindy Pettmann]
[mail message to:] listserv@csf.colorado.edu

For further information contact:

Deborah Stienstra

Department of Political Science,
University of Winnipeg,
515 Portage Ave,
Winnipeg MB R3B 2E9

CANADA.

For further information on the ISA Femisa section contact:

Newsletter co-chair,
Francine D'Amico,
89 Coventry Rod,
Endicott, NY 13760,
USA.

I have agreed to act as a contact point for Femisa in Australia, and am gathering information on the Australian scene. If you have a teaching or research interest in feminist IR/the international, please contact:

Jan Jindy Pettman,
Political Science,
The Faculties,
Australian National University.

Debate: Review of Contemporary German Affairs

Debate is a new journal, published by Berg, the main English language publisher of books of Germany, and edited by a team under Gunter Minnerup. There are other journals which deal with some of the same subject matter. German Politics began publication in 1992. But, judging by the first issue, Debate is invaluable for two reasons. First its orientation to German affairs is critical and not bounded by the orthodoxies of particular academic disciplines. Secondly the journal includes useful material not normally found in academic journals.

The first issue devotes considerable space to economic concerns. 'The Bundesbank - Unelected Government of Germany and Eu-

rope' offer a critique of the history, structure, policies and theories behind the German central bank's activities. This is complemented by an interview with Wilhelm Noling of the Bank's Council. In 'Transforming of East German Economy' Rudolf Hickel presents arguments against the Kohl Government's policies in the 'new federal states' of eastern Germany. Hickel is associated with the group which produces most prominent left social democratic alternative proposals to Government economic policy in the form of the annual publication memorandum. Dorothy Rosenberg specifically analyses the detrimental implications of unification for women and the weakness of the feminist response. The issue also features an interview with the writer Martin Walser, a review article of books on German unification and shorter reviews.

For teaching, research and general background on contemporary Germany Debate is essential reading. Debate (ISSN 0965-156X) is available from Berg Publishers: Debate 150 Crowley Rd, Oxford OX4 1JJ, UK.

Subscriptions for two issues a year: £15 for individuals and £30 for institutions, airmail £4 extra. Include credit card number, expiry date and signature to pay by Mastercard or Visa.

Rick Kuhn

*Department of Political Science,
Australian National University.*